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Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed introduced the distinction between property rules and liability rules just over twenty
years ago.' Writing primarily about property and tort law, Calabresi and Melamed pointed out that a complete description of the
law in those areas requires not only a specification of the entitlements to be protected, but also a specification of the kind of protection to be provided. A property rule strictly prohibits X from
infringing Y's entitlement, with the prohibition enforced by injunctive relief or, if necessary, by criminal sanctions. A liability rule, in
contrast, protects Y only by allowing him to collect compensatory
damages if X infringes his entitlement.While Calabresi and Melamed wrote about cases in which X
takes from Y without any pretense of a contract, similar issues
arise if X tries to take from Y under color of a contract that was
not properly formed. If X forces Y to sign a contract at gunpoint,
for example, or if she uses fraud to trick him into signing, the resulting "contract" will not be recognized as valid. Under the
modern doctrine of unconscionability, Y might also be released
from onerous clauses hidden in fine print, or from contracts he

I Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972).
2 In each of my examples, X is the alleged wrongdoer and Y the complaining victim.
For convenience in the use of pronouns, all examples involve a female X and a male Y.
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agreed to only because of X's monopoly position. While there has
been much controversy concerning whether fine print or monopoly
ought to invalidate X's contract, too little attention has been paid
to the two forms of protection Y can be given if X's contract is
indeed invalidated. Roughly speaking, if a property rule protects
Y, then X cannot enforce any obligation against him; X must negotiate in some more acceptable way if she wants to create an enforceable obligation. In contrast, if a liability rule protects Y, then
X can enforce those obligations whose substance seems reasonable
to a reviewing court, notwithstanding any improprieties involved in
the contract's formation.
Part I of this Article develops the distinction between property rules and liability rules in more detail and discusses how
courts should choose between these two forms of protection in
cases where X has not properly obtained Y's consent. It also discusses how courts should make the choice between the better of
these alternatives and the remaining possibility: enforcing X's contract as written, without any judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of its terms. The distinction between property rules and liability rules is also used to explain why both "substantive
unconscionability" and "procedural unconscionability" are required to invalidate X's contract in certain cases (though not in
all), and to evaluate the substantive criteria courts might use in
determining the reasonableness of contract terms in any case
where only the unreasonable terms are to be invalidated. Part II
then applies Part I's analysis to a series of actual contract
problems.
I. THEORY
In property and tort law, liability rules permit X to infringe
Y's entitlement, but require her to compensate Y with monetary
damages. To implement a liability rule, therefore, the court must
not only decide whether an infringement has taken place, but must
also determine damages. The damage award can be viewed as a
judicially-determined "price" that X must pay for her infringement.' A liability rule thus allows X to purchase the use of Y's
entitlement without negotiating with Y directly: X can simply take
the entitlement, then allow the court to select an appropriate price.
Property rules, by contrast, are designed to deter X from taking

3

Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum L Rev 1523, 1523-25 (1984). A liabil-

ity rule is one example of what Cooter calls a "price," while a property rule (more precisely,
the penalty imposed on one who violates a property rule) is one example of what Cooter
calls a "sanction."
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Y's entitlement unless X negotiates with Y and the two settle on a
mutually agreeable price.
In contract law, it has often been recognized that the remedies
for breach of contract can be classified as either property rules or
liability rules.4 The ordinary remedy of expectation damages resembles a liability rule, for it allows one party to break the contract whenever she is willing to pay the court's estimate of the
value of her performance to the other party. By contrast, the remedy of specific performance protects the promisee with a property
rule, barring the promisor from breaking the contract unless she
negotiates her release from the promisee. The same is true of other
damage measures designed to deter breach rather than merely to
compensate the promisee-for example, in terrorem penalty
clauses or punitive damages. 5
Though it does not appear to have been noted before, the defenses available at the time of contract formation can also be classified as property rules or liability rules. The defense of duress, for
example, protects victims with a property rule. If X puts a gun to
Y's head and forces him to sign a contract of sale, X cannot simply
take the goods and then, when the duress is pointed out to a court,
offer to keep the goods and pay whatever reasonable value the
court assigns. Instead, Y is entitled to rescind the contract and
take his goods back. This result forces X to negotiate properly with
Y in order to acquire Y's goods-with a "proper" negotiation, in
this context, meaning negotiation without the use of duress. In this
respect, the doctrine of duress protects Y with the equivalent of a
property rule.
Other defenses provide only the protection of a liability rule.
Suppose, for example, that Y is a shipwrecked sailor and X commands the only vessel in position to rescue him. Suppose further
that X takes advantage of her position to demand that Y pay an
exorbitant price for being rescued. Finally, suppose that the hard
choice facing Y-agree to X's terms or drown-is deemed sufficient
to invalidate the resulting contract.
This last assumption is somewhat controversial. It can be argued that Y's economic or physical hardship should not be sufficient to release him from the resulting contract, so long as X's

4 This analogy was first drawn in Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U
Chi L Rev 351, 352 (1978).
5 On the connection between punitive damages and property rules, see David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney and Menahem Spiegel, An OrdinaryEconomic Rationale for ExtraordinaryLegal Sanctions, 78 Cal L Rev 1 (1990).
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wrongful acts did not cause the hardship. At this point, however,
my concern is with the further distinction a court must make even
if it accepts that Y is not bound by a contract signed under conditions of dire necessity. Specifically, the law must protect Y with
either a property rule or a liability rule. A property rule would prevent X from acquiring any enforceable claim against Y unless and
until she obtains his agreement under "proper" conditions-that
is, conditions untainted by economic or physical necessity. By contrast, a liability rule would allow X to acquire an enforceable claim
against Y even without obtaining his untainted consent, but the
amount of the claim would be limited to a reasonable value determined by the courts. Courts actually do the latter in these cases, if
they accord Y any protection at all. In doctrinal terms, the courts
treat Y's necessity as a complete defense to any contractual claim
X might raise, but allow X to sue in restitution for the court-determined reasonable value of her services. 7 In the terms of Calabresi
and Melamed, courts protect Y with a liability rule rather than a
property rule.
It should be noted that, in order to classify the rules of contract formation as property rules or liability rules, I have had to
introduce the notion of "proper" or "untainted" consent. By this I
mean nothing more than the set of procedures which, if followed,
will make an obligation enforceable regardless of whether the content of the obligation seems reasonable to a reviewing court. In analytic jurisprudence, these procedures would be described as contract law's "enabling rules." 8 Calabresi and Melamed required no
such concept, for in their analysis the infringer, X, chose between
the two extreme strategies of (1) negotiating and obtaining Y's unquestionably proper consent, or (2) invading Y's interests without

6 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal,18 J
L & Econ 293, 297 (1975).
See, for example, Post v Jones, 60 US (19 How) 150, 159-60 (1856). See generally
Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 8-15 at 578-79 (Foundation, 2d ed 1975).
8 H.J.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 18-25 (Clarendon, 1961). There are some contracts-contracts of slavery, for example-that will not be enforced no matter how knowing
and voluntary the procedure by which they were formed. These contracts have no enabling
rules: in Calabresi and Melamed's terms, Y's entitlement not to be sold into slavery is inalienable. Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1111-15 (cited in note 1). Inalienable
entitlements are beyond the scope of this paper (but see note 52). Further discussions of
inalienable entitlements can be found in Randy E. Barnett, ContractRemedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc Phil & Policy 179 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?,
85 Colum L Rev 970 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 Harv L Rev
1849 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property Rights, 85
Colum L Rev 931 (1985).
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negotiating at all. My concern is with a third set of cases in which
X purports to have obtained Y's consent, but may have done so in
an improper way. My analysis thus requires a distinction between:
(1) cases where X properly negotiates and obtains Y's consent
before asserting rights against Y, and (2) cases where X asserts
rights against Y without having properly obtained Y's consent.
Viewed in these terms, the law of contract formation must
perform three distinct tasks. First, the law must develop some definition of "proper" consent. Second, in those cases lacking proper
consent, courts must decide whether to protect Y with a property
rule or a liability rule. Third, in those cases where Y is protected
with a liability rule, there must be some criteria by which the court
can decide what obligation would be most "reasonable." Figure 1
depicts the relationship among these tasks in the form of a standard decision tree.
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In this Article, I propose to sidestep the first of these tasks for
as long as possible by simply accepting arguendo various definitions of proper consent. Moreover, the definitions I accept will usually be the most stringent: the definitions that most often lead to a
conclusion that Y's consent was not properly obtained. This allows
me to focus on the second and third tasks: the choice between
property rules and liability rules in cases which lack proper consent, and the criteria for deciding which obligations should be enforced when proper consent is lacking and liability rules apply.
Only then, in the final section of Part I, do I discuss the implica-
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tions this analysis might have for the definition of proper consent.
In terms of the decision tree depicted in Figure 1, I propose to
begin with the lower branches and work backwards toward the initial definition of consent.
A.

Choosing Between Property and Liability Rules
1. Deterring improper consent.

In property and tort law, property rules are designed to deter
X from invading Y's interests. In contract law, they are designed to
deter X from failing to obtain Y's proper consent. Figure 1 illustrates how adopting a property rule can make the lower branches
of the tree sufficiently unattractive to X that she chooses to obtain
Y's proper consent. If X obtains Y's proper consent, the case
moves to the upper branch of the decision tree, and X's contract
will be enforced according to its terms.
One way to make the lower branches of the tree unattractive
to X is to not enforce any obligation whatsoever on behalf of any X
who has failed to obtain Y's proper consent. For example, if X
forces Y to purchase her goods at gunpoint, the court can allow Y
to rescind the contract entirely. This outcome may deter X from
using duress because it denies X any profit from her dealings with
Y, unless she properly obtains Y's consent.
Some cases, however, may require a stronger penalty to deter
X (and others like her) from using duress, or from otherwise failing
to obtain Y's proper consent. Under the rule described above, the
worst that can happen to X is that she will have to rescind the
contract. If Y would not buy X's goods without a gun to his head,
X will be no worse off if she tries the gun and fails than if she did
not use the gun in the first place. In these cases, to fully deter
duress some penalty heavier than mere non-enforcement is needed.
For example, X could be barred from her right to recover any
goods delivered to Y pursuant to the now-invalid contract-although only by coincidence would this additional sanction
happen to achieve just the right level of deterrence. Stronger deterrence could also be obtained by subjecting X to punitive damages, criminal penalties, or any other augmented sanction. 9 There

9 For a similar suggestion, see Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 126 n 174 (1989).
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is a danger though: in some settings stronger sanctions may induce
overdeterrence1 0
In short, it will not always be easy to determine the optimal
penalty to use in implementing a property rule. Nevertheless, rescinding the contract and refusing to enforce any of X's terms will
rarely be so severe a sanction as to induce overdeterrence, which
suggests that rescission at least makes sense as a minimum sanction. Moreover, rescission also has the advantage of administrative
convenience, as it does not require the courts to enforce anything
on behalf of either party. Thus, in any case where we want to deter
X from entering into a transaction without obtaining Y's proper
consent, protecting Y with a property rule has much to recommend
it.
The harder question is whether we always want to deter X
from entering into a transaction without obtaining proper consent.
The preceding analysis assumed that the law's goal was to induce
the X's of the world to obtain proper consent, but that goal will
not always be appropriate. Indeed, the insight of Calabresi and
Melamed was that in some instances consent is too costly to obtain, so the law should not attempt to deter all nonconsensual
transactions. As the following subsection will demonstrate, a similar point can be made about the cost of obtaining proper consent
in contractual settings.
2.

The cost of obtaining proper consent.

Property rules require X to secure Y's actual consent to any
taking, while liability rules rest (at most) on a kind of hypothetical
consent, if we presume Y would have been willing to sell his interest at the court-determined price. Property rules are thus preferable under any autonomy-based theory that attaches particular importance to a right-holder's actual rather than hypothetical
consent.1 1 Rules that induce the parties to negotiate to actual con10 If the rules defining duress (and other violations of Y's proper consent) are at all
uncertain, severe sanctions could produce a "chilling effect" which would cause X to avoid
any conduct that even approaches violating Y's rights. See, for example, Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Accident Law 79-83, 93-99 (Harvard, 1987) (analyzing uncertainty in
negligence law); Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards,2 J L Econ & Org 279 (1986). If X is risk-averse, higher penalties combined with
uncertain enforcement can also impose direct welfare losses by increasing X's risk-bearing
costs. Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probabilityand Magnitude of Finesfor Acts That Definitely Are Undeiirable, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 3 (1992).
11 For various perspectives on the relation between actual and hypothetical consent, see
Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va L
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sent may also have efficiency advantages, for if the court selects a
price on behalf of the parties, an unduly low price could permit an
inefficient taking while an unduly high price could block an efficient one. As Calabresi and Melamed put it:
[W]hy not convert all property rules into liability rules? ...
Liability rules represent only an approximation of the value of
the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an
approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the
thief than to the owner. In other words, quite apart from the
expense of arriving collectively at such an objective valuation,
12
it is no guarantee of the economic efficiency of the transfer.
In some tort or nuisance cases, however, it may be unduly expensive to require X to obtain Y's consent prior to infringing Y's
entitlements. If X is an automobile driver, it would be prohibitively expensive for her to negotiate with each pedestrian to determine a mutually agreeable rate of compensation for any future injuries. If X owns a factory whose pollution affects an entire urban
area, it would be equally prohibitive for her to negotiate a mutually agreeable price with every affected resident. If acquiring the
consent of all victims would be unduly expensive, Calabresi and
Melamed suggest that liability rules may be more attractive. 13
Essentially the same analysis can be applied to contract formation cases. As the examples in the following paragraphs illustrate, even where only two parties are involved, the costs of obtaining Y's "proper" consent depend heavily on just what is

Rev 821 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default
Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud,15 Hazy J L & Pub Pol 783
(1992); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains:The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich L Rev 1815 (1991); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, and
Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure
Rules in ContractLaw, 12 Harv J L & Pub Pol 639 (1989); Richard Craswell, Efficiency and
Rational Bargainingin ContractualSettings, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol 805 (1992).
" Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1125 (cited in note 1)(footnote omitted).
Depending on the price the court sets for an infringement, liability rules may also produce
different distributional effects than property rules, thus giving rise to undesirable strategic
incentives. For a discussion of these issues, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, I'd Rather Be Liable
Than You: A Note on PropertyRules and Liability Rules, 6 Intl Rev L & Econ 255 (1986);
David D. Haddock and Fred S. McChesney, Bargaining Costs, BargainingBenefits, and
Compulsory NonbargainingRules, 7 J L Econ & Org 334 (1991); Haddock, McChesney, and
Spiegel, 78 Cal L Rev at 13-18, 35-51 (cited in note 5). These distributional effects are less
significant when liability rules are applied to contract formation, because a party who is
subject to an unfavorable liability rule may be able to respond by raising her price. See note
48.
IS Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1106-10 (cited in note 1).
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deemed necessary for Y's consent to be proper.14 In some cases,
therefore, it may be appropriate to spare X that task by adopting a
liability rule.
Consider first a case of duress, in which the only impediment
to proper consent is that X held a gun to Y's head while he signed
the contract. X could easily have removed this impediment by removing the gun. Accordingly, this case warrants protecting Y by
means of a property rule, under which X will not be allowed to
enforce any obligations against Y if she secures his agreement at
gunpoint.
A different conclusion is required in most cases of physical necessity, as when Y is a shipwrecked sailor and X refuses to take
him on board unless he promises to pay her an exorbitant sum.
Even if we assume that consent given under dire necessity does not
qualify as "proper" consent, protecting Y with a property rule has
little to recommend it. A property rule prevents X from collecting
any payment from Y unless she gets Y's agreement under conditions constituting proper consent. But if consent under conditions
of dire necessity is deemed not to constitute proper consent, there
is no way for X to obtain Y's proper consent to any obligation,
because in this case there is no way to eliminate Y's dire necessity. 15 In short, applying a property rule in this scenario would bar
X from collecting even a reasonable amount for her rescue services.
This outcome suggests that if dire necessity is deemed inconsistent
with proper consent, Y ought to be protected by a liability rule
rather than a property rule.
Liability rules may also be appropriate in cases involving fineprint contracts. Suppose that X sells Y an automobile pursuant to
a contract with a number of fine-print clauses that limit the scope
of her warranty. Suppose, too, that consumers such as Y are
deemed not to be under any duty to read the fine print, so that Y's
signature on the contract does not represent proper consent to
terms that have not been pointed out and explained to him. (If Y's
signature is itself taken as proper consent to everything in the con" Two-person negotiations may also be costly if strategic posturing and the threat of
hold-outs prevent the parties from agreeing on efficient terms. In two-party negotiations,
however, these costs are not normally thought to justify giving one party the equivalent of
the power of eminent domain, thereby allowing her to acquire enforceable obligations (at a
court-determined price) in spite of the other party's hold-out. Consequently, in this paper I
ignore these negotiating costs by assuming them to be zero.
15 X could, of course, rescue Y for free, then begin bargaining with him once he is safe
on land-but once Y is safe on land, he no longer has any need to purchase X's rescue
services.
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tract, then enforcement of the contract will not violate any of Y's
entitlements, and the choice between property rules and liability
rules will never arise).
This example is not quite like that of the shipwrecked sailor,
for in this case X can remove the impediment to proper consent.
For example, in Gerhardt v Continental Insurance Companies,16
the buyer sought reimbursement from an insurance company to
cover her liability (under New York workers' compensation law)
for an injury suffered by her domestic servant. The policy excluded
coverage for just this sort of liability, but the buyer had not read
the policy and was unaware of this exclusion. The insurer could
have prevented this misunderstanding by pointing out the exclusion to the buyer and, if necessary, explaining its practical significance. Thus, protecting the buyer in this case with a property rule
could encourage sellers to explain such provisions in the future.
Under a property rule, no seller would be allowed to enforce any
limitation in a fine-print contract that had not been pointed out
and explained prior to the sale.
While sellers can provide such explanations, however, the
transaction costs of doing so could be very high. If the failure to
point out or explain a clause triggers a property rule, no fine-print
clauses-not even substantively reasonable ones-will be enforceable unless they have first been pointed out and explained. But the
insurance policy in Gerhardt contained a number of other exclusions in fine print, including clauses excluding coverage of accidents involving sailboats over 26 feet, motorboats of more than
fifty horsepower, or "midget automobiles. ' 17 The court described
the policy's exclusions as running to "many printed pages" of fine
print.18 Moreover, many of these exclusions would have been complicated to explain-as the court observed, the buyer "might not
know anything at all about the difference between a common law
liability claim and a workmen's compensation claim .... "1 9 If none
of these clauses could be enforced without a full explanation in
advance, then no legally enforceable insurance policy could ever be
sold except to buyers who were willing to attend a three-day seminar explaining all the possible risks that were or were not covered
by the policy.

1648 NJ 291, 225 A2d 328 (1966).
17 225 A2d at 330.

Is Id at 329.
19 Id at 333.
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To be sure, if society placed a high enough value on consumer
education, three-day seminars prior to every sale might be seen as
enhancing the quality of life, in which case a property rule
designed to induce such seminars would make perfect sense. The
decision about which transaction costs are worth incurring thus depends partly on tha values served by those costs, as well as on their
magnitude. My only point here is that if one prefers to leave consumers more time to pursue goals other than attending three-day
seminars, the problem posed by consumers' unawareness of fineprint terms would be better addressed by a liability rule rather
than a property rule. A liability rule would allow sellers to enforce
reasonable fine-print exclusions even if they had not been pointed
out in advance of the sale, thus eliminating the need for three-day
seminars. 2°
In short, a liability rule reduces transaction costs by freeing
sellers from having to negotiate for "proper" consent, so long as
the sellers are willing to enforce only those terms the court considers reasonable. If the transaction costs saved by this method are
large enough, it may be better to relieve sellers of the burden of
obtaining proper consent by protecting buyers with a liability rule
rather than a property rule. However, the desirability of this approach (as well as its success) will depend heavily on how a court
decides what obligations are sufficiently "reasonable" to enforce
once a liability rule is applied. This topic will be addressed in Section I.B.
3.

An analogy to selecting default rules.

Before turning to Section I.B, it should be noted that the analysis just presented has much in common with that recently applied
by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner to the selection of default rules.2 1
Default rules apply when parties to an otherwise enforceable contract fail to provide for some particular contingency. Examples include the doctrines of impracticability and mistake, which allocate
the risks of unexpected problems if those risks were not expressly
allocated in the contract; and the various implied warranty doctrines, which allocate the risks of product failure for a contract
that does not expressly specify the extent of the seller's warranty.
20 Another solution, essentially equivalent to that described in the text, is to treat buyers as having in fact consented to all reasonable terms contained in the fine-print contract,
but not as having consented to any unreasonable terms. This solution is discussed in the

text accompanying notes 79-81.
21 Ayres

and Gertner, 99 Yale L J 87 (cited in note 9).
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It has often been suggested that default rules should reflect
whatever risk-allocation most contracting parties would choose, if
only to save most parties the cost of transacting around the default
rule. 2 Ayres and Gertner point out, however, that the law often
adopts what they call a "penalty default rule"-that is, a rule chosen deliberately to be unattractive to at least one of the contracting parties. For example, if the parties to a sales contract fail
to specify the quantity they intend to buy or sell, the court will not
fill this gap with its estimate of a reasonable quantity. Instead, the
court will simply refuse to enforce the contract: it will set a default
quantity of zero. Such a rule gives the parties an incentive to spell
out the quantity in the contract, and frees the court from having to
construct its own estimate of a "reasonable" quantity.2 3
A penalty default rule thus serves many of the same functions
as a property rule. Each encourages the parties to work out their
own solution through explicit negotiations, freeing the courts from
having to decide what solution would be most reasonable. By contrast, the alternative to a penalty default rule-a default allocation
chosen for its inherent reasonableness, or what Ayres and Gertner
called a "majoritarian" default rule 2 4 -is very similar to a liability
22 For discussions of this principle see id at 93-95; Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S Cal L Rev 629, 633 (1988);
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal L Rev 261 (1985); Richard A. Posner and Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J Legal Stud 83, 88-89 (1977); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor
Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L J 353, 361 (1988).
22 Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 95-97 (cited in note 9). As Ayres and Gertner
recognized, penalty default rules have much in common with the legal rules Lon Fuller had
earlier described as "formalities." Id at 123-25; Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41
Colum L Rev 799, 799-806 (1941). For a similar analysis of formalities, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 1690-94,
1697-1701 (1976).
24 Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 93 (cited in note 9). Because Ayres and Gertner
identify "majoritarian" default rules as those embodying the solution that would be the
most reasonable for a majority of contracting pairs, they occasionally attach the label "penalty default rule" to a default rule selected on any other basis, including a default rule that
would be most reasonable for some minority of contracting pairs. See id at 108-17 (considering the choice between two possible default rules to govern the allocation of unusually high
losses in cases such as Hadley v Baxendale, 9 Ex 341, 156 Eng Rep 145 (1854) (miller sought
consequential damages for lost profits when carrier delayed transportation of broken crank
shaft)). In Calabresi and Melamed's terminology, each of these default rules is similar to a
liability rule, as each requires a court to determine what solution would be most reasonable
for at least one group of contracting pairs. The default rules that most resemble property
rules are those that embody some arbitrary solution chosen without regard to reasonableness for any contracting pairs. The "zero quantity default," which sets the enforceable
quantity at zero for those pairs who fail to specify a quantity, is a good example of a true
property rule.
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rule. Under a majoritarian default rule, the parties are free to create an enforceable contract without having explicitly consented to
any rule that would govern the issue in question. However, if a
dispute arises, the court will select its own (or the legislature's)
resolution of that issue, in order to ensure that the only obligations
imposed without the parties' explicit consent are those the court
(or legislature) deems reasonable.
Given this similarity between penalty default rules and property rules, and between majoritarian default rules and liability
rules, it is hardly surprising that the conditions under which
majoritarian default rules are preferable are similar to the conditions under which liability rules are preferable. In particular,
majoritarian default rules (like liability rules) become more attractive the greater the transaction costs required to explicitly negotiate any given point. Penalty default rules become more attractive
when the cost of explicit negotiations is relatively low, and/or when
courts are ill-equipped to determine a reasonable solution.2 5 This
was exactly the trade-off recommended by Calabresi and Melamed; 26 it is also the trade-off recommended here.
4. Analogies in restitution.
In a slightly different guise, the same trade-off is central to the
economic analysis of restitution and quasi-contract. Consider, for
example, a doctor who encounters an unconscious patient on the
street, provides medical services, then submits her bill when the
patient recovers. If the patient is unconscious, the cost of securing
the patient's explicit consent to pay for the medical services is almost surely prohibitive. Accordingly, Richard Posner has argued
that the doctor should be allowed to collect something for her services.17 However, Posner would protect unconscious patients by
having the court set the amount of the doctor's recovery. This is
precisely the protection provided by a liability rule.
By contrast, Posner recommends a different result for the violinist who, without having been asked, plays a lovely serenade just
outside someone's window. Posner argues that even if the listener
enjoys the serenade, the courts should not let the violinist sue for a
reasonable fee for her services, because the violinist (unlike the
doctor) could easily have approached the listener beforehand and

25
26

Ayres and Gertner, 99 Yale L J at 96 (cited in note 9).
Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1106-10 (cited in note 1).
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 134-34 (Little Brown, 4th ed 1992).
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explicitly negotiated an acceptable price. The violinist's failure to
secure the listener's proper consent should therefore bar her from
any recovery whatsoever.2 In other words, Posner would protect
the listener with a property rule.
In summary, there are many similarities between the following
three situations:
(1) cases where one party does not even purport to obtain the
other's consent, as in the tort and nuisance cases analyzed by
Calabresi and Melamed, or the doctor and the violinist analyzed by Posner;
(2) cases where the parties consent to a contract but do not
purport to specify all of the ancillary obligations, as in the
default rules analyzed by Ayres and Gertner; and
(3) cases where one party purports to have obtained the
other's consent to some specified obligation, but does so by an
arguably improper method, as in the unconscionability cases
analyzed here.
In each case, the courts can respond by following either of two
strategies. One strategy is to decide for the parties which obligations would have been most reasonable: this is the strategy of liability rules or majoritarian default rules. Alternatively, the courts
can attempt to induce the parties to decide for themselves what
obligations are reasonable: this is the strategy of property rules or
penalty defaults. The attractiveness of this second strategy will depend heavily on the costs the parties must incur to create a legally
valid agreement. These costs, in turn, are heavily dependent on the
rules defining the requirements for "proper" consent. By contrast,
the attractiveness of the first strategy-empowering the courts to
select reasonable terms for the parties-depends on the difficulties
courts face in selecting reasonable terms. In terms of the decision
tree depicted in Figure 1, the attractiveness of the path labelled
"liability rules" depends in part on the difficulty of the choices
courts must make further down that path. These difficulties are
addressed in the following section.
B.

Judging "Reasonableness" Under a Liability Rule

The hallmark of a liability rule is that it requires the court to
distinguish reasonable from unreasonable obligations. Of course,

11

Id at 134. Saul Levmore has labelled this the "market encouraging" effect of denying

restitution. Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va L Rev 65, 79-81 (1985).
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the court need not use the word "reasonableness" to make this decision, but whatever word is used, the court must have some
method of deciding which obligations will. be enforced when proper
consent is lacking. Moreover, because this test comes into play
only when proper consent is lacking, the test cannot choose between enforceability and unenforceability based on whether the
parties properly consented to the term in question. Instead, the
test must distinguish enforceable from unenforceable obligations
on the basis of the obligation's content or substance. In this paper,
I use "reasonableness" (or "substantive reasonableness") as a
catch-all to describe any test that serves this function.
There are several ways in which a reasonableness criterion can
be coupled with a liability rule. In the simplest version, the court
enforces X's contract as written whenever X obtained Y's proper
consent, and the court enforces whatever obligations the court
deems reasonable whenever X failed to obtain Y's proper consent.
In this case, any of X's terms whose substance was deemed unreasonable by the court would be struck down, but replaced by obligations the court considers reasonable.29
A subtle variation of this approach would prohibit X from enforcing reasonable terms in place of terms found unreasonable by
the court, while allowing X to enforce terms the court considers
reasonable. Under this approach, if X asked only a reasonable
price for rescuing Y then she may collect that price, but if she
forced Y to sign a contract containing an exorbitant price then she
may not collect anything. This variation provides additional deterrence-not against entering into a contract without obtaining Y's
proper consent, as under a property rule,30 but against including
unreasonable (and unenforceable) terms in contracts where Y's
proper consent will not be obtained. Under the rule described in
the preceding paragraph, the only "penalty" X suffers for including an unreasonable term in her contract is that she will only be
able to enforce a reasonable term, which leaves her no worse off
than if she had used a reasonable term in the first place. This may
not sufficiently deter X from trying to get away with unreasonable

29 It is also possible for courts to adopt a range of "reasonableness," upholding any of
X's terms that fall within that range, but striking down any terms that fall outside it (and
replacing those terms with terms selected from within the range). For a formal model with
these attributes, see Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in
Contracts,21 RAND J Econ 518 (1990).
30 See Section I.A.1.
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terms, especially if many buyers do not know their legal rights or
do not find it worth their while to take X to court.
In its use of penalties designed to achieve deterrence, the rule
just described may seem to have more in common with property
rules than liability rules. For most purposes, though, the rule just
described is more usefully classified as a liability rule. The rule just
described is designed to induce X to include only reasonable terms
in the contract when she has not obtained Y's proper consent. It is
not designed to induce her to obtain Y's proper consent, as would
be the case under a property rule. Moreover, a property rule
achieves its goal by imposing some penalty in every case where X
fails to obtain Y's proper consent, while the rule just described imposes a penalty only when X fails to obtain Y's proper consent and
the substance of X's contract terms is deemed unreasonable by a
reviewing court. Thus, in both its purpose and in its requirement
of some standard of substantive reasonableness, this rule is best
analyzed as a liability rule.
1.

Procedural vs. substantive unconscionability.

The fact that liability rules require courts to evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the challenged terms helps explain the
relationship between "procedural unconscionability" and "substantive unconscionability." Those two concepts were introduced by
Arthur Leff to distinguish between "bargaining naughtiness" (procedural unconscionability) and "evils in the resulting contract"
(substantive unconscionability) .31 Most statements of the law of
unconscionability now hold that both procedural and substantive
unconscionability are required before courts will grant relief from a
challenged term.32 Judicial decisions have not consistently followed
this principle, however, and some courts have suggested a vaguely
mathematical metaphor in which a large amount of one type of
unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the

11Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U Pa L Rev 485, 487 (1967).
" See Williams v Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo., 350 F2d 445, 449 (DC Cir 1965) (defining an unconscionable contract as one that combines "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties [procedural unconscionability] together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party [substantive unconscionalility]").
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other.3 3 Some scholars have questioned the utility of the entire
distinction. 4
On the view taken here, the relationship between procedural
and substantive unconscionability turns on whether a property
rule or a liability rule is the more appropriate method of protecting
the weaker party. Under a property rule, procedural unconscionability (or what I call a "lack of proper consent") suffices to invalidate challenged terms, without requiring any showing of substantive unconscionability. For example, if a property rule governs
cases of duress, and X forces Y to sign a contract at gunpoint, Y
should be excused from the resulting contract without any further
showing. That is, X should not be allowed to reinstate the contract
by showing that the price and other terms of the deal were entirely
reasonable. Nor should the court enforce other, more reasonable
terms in place of those struck down. One point of a property rule,
after all, is to spare the court the need to decide which obligations
are substantively reasonable, by encouraging the parties to decide
such matters themselves.
On the other hand, in cases governed by a liability rule, both
procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability
are prerequisites to relief. If a liability rule applies to fine-print
exclusions, and Y purchases an insurance policy with thirty pages
of fine-print exclusions, the mere fact that those exclusions were
too many to read or understand should not make each of the exclusions unenforceable. If fine-print problems are properly governed
by a liability rule, it must be because we do not seriously want to
induce X to explain every exclusion. A rule that denies enforcement to every unexplained exclusion would therefore be counterproductive, if X responded by trying to explain every exclusion
orally.
Of course, rather than trying to explain every exclusion orally,
X might respond by resigning herself to the fact that the unexplained exclusions would not be enforced. But this result will also
be counterproductive if the unexplained exclusions include "reasonable" exclusions that would benefit buyers as well as sellers-for example, exclusions that hold down the costs of insurance

11 See, for example, Tacoma Boatbuilding Co., Inc. v Delta Fishing Co., Inc., 28 UCC
26, 37 n 20 (W D Wash 1980). See generally James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 4-7 (West, 3d ed 1988).
" Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv L Rev 741,
752-54 (1982); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A
New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 Cornell L Rev 1, 2-5 (1981).
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without significantly increasing most buyers' risks. If a liability
rule is indeed appropriate, therefore-in this example, if there are
too many reasonable exclusions to be practicably explained-the
courts should not respond to a failure to obtain proper consent by
refusing to enforce any unexplained obligation. Instead, courts
should refuse to enforce only those unexplained obligations that
also fail to pass some reasonableness test. In other words, courts
should require a showing of both procedural and substantive
5
unconscionability3
This analysis also suggests just how and when greater degrees
of procedural unconscionability can substitute for substantive unconscionability. If we worsen the insurance contract example by
adding any other factor that would normally trigger (at most) a
liability rule-for example, if we add that Y is in desperate need of
insurance and cannot survive in business without it-this fact
should not have any effect on the required showing of substantive
unconscionability. But if we worsen the example by having X force
Y to purchase the policy at gunpoint, Y should be released without
having to show that any element of the policy was substantively
unreasonable. That is, this form of augmented procedural unconscionability should eliminate any requirement that substantive unconscionability be shown as well.
The difference between these examples is not merely that duress is a "worse" form of procedural unconscionability than taking
advantage of necessity or failing to explain a fine-print contract, or
that duress represents a larger "amount" of procedural unconscionability than either of the other two problems. Both of these
figures of speech may perhaps be valid, but they represent at best
an awkward groping toward understanding why Y should have to
show substantive unconscionability in one case and not in the
other. A better understanding comes from realizing that classic
gun-to-the-head duress is a problem which can easily be eliminated
by X, while necessity and fine-print terms are problems which X

13

There is potential for terminological confusion here, for "substantive unconscionabil-

ity" is sometimes used to designate clauses whose substance is so bad that they cannot be
enforced no matter how fairly and voluntarily Y agreed to them. This terminology corresponds to what Calabresi and Melamed call an inalienable entitlement. See note 8. When I
speak of "substantive unconscionability," I mean nothing more than that the clause fails the
criteria of reasonableness used to implement a liability rule. As long as these criteria are
applied only to clauses to which Y never properly consented-that is, as long as they are
applied only when there is also some form of "procedural unconscionability"-these criteria
can be somewhat weaker than the criteria needed to invalidate a term when each party has
given his or her proper consent.
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either cannot eliminate or cannot eliminate at an acceptable cost.
This means that duress is best governed by a property rule, while
necessity and failure to explain a fine-print contracts are best governed by a liability rule. To say that substantive unconscionability
must be shown in the latter case but not in the former, is simply to
restate the point that liability rules require the courts to conduct a
substantive analysis of the contested obligation, while property
rules impose no such requirement.
2. Possible substantive criteria.
How, then, should courts evaluate the substance of a contested
obligation when required to do so under a liability rule? When the
contested obligation concerns the price X tries to charge, a court
implementing a liability rule will need criteria for deciding what
constitutes a reasonable price. For example, in the shipwrecked
sailor example, the court will have to determine a reasonable price
for Y's rescue services. Applying a liability rule to prices requires
the court to operate as a kind of price-setting commission, much
like the state commissions formed to regulate public utilities and
other natural monopolies.36
In most cases, though, the contested obligation concerns a
non-price term such as an insurance exclusion or a limitation on
the seller's warranty. Indeed, White and Summers report that the
number of unconscionability cases challenging an excessive price
has "dwindled to a trickle.

'37

Unfortunately, the substantive crite-

ria that might be used to evaluate non-price obligations are more
diverse, and cannot easily be reduced to a formula such as "cost

3' As the possible criteria for judging the reasonableness of prices have been thoroughly
canvassed in the literature on utility regulation, that discussion will not be repeated here.
See generally Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform chs 2-3, 8 (Harvard, 1982);
Richard Schmalensee, The Control of Natural Monopolies (Heath-Lexington, 1979). For an
interesting review of the various criteria reflected in the Aristotelian, Roman, and medieval
theories of the "just price" doctrine, see James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Cal L
Rev 1587 (1981).
Of course, as many writers have noted, the record of public utility commissions is not
one that inspires confidence. See, for example, Paul L. Joskow and Roger C. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice:An Overview, in Gary Fromm, ed, Studies in Public Regulation 1, 49-53 (MIT, 1981); George J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation ch 5 (Chicago, 1975). The fact that public utility commissions have not performed well
in trying to set reasonable rates raises questions about how well common law courts can be
expected to perform an analogous function. This and other questions concerning the extent
of judicial expertise will be taken up in Section I.C.1.
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 4-5 at 194 (cited in note 33).
31
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plus reasonable profit." This section briefly surveys some of the
criteria that might be employed.
a) Economic efficiency. Standard economic analysis
compares the amount buyers gain from more favorable obligations,
measured by the maximum buyers would be willing to pay for
those obligations, to the amount sellers would lose. If the buyer's
gain exceeds the seller's losses, the obligation in question will be
considered reasonable, and the seller will be allowed to enforce it.
If not, the obligation will be considered unreasonable, and enforcement will be barred.
This form of economic analysis has often been criticized for its
normative premises, some of which will be discussed below. Even if
one accepts its normative premises, however, this form of economic
analysis can also be criticized for its difficulty. The relationship between an obligation's net costs and benefits will depend on (1) each
party's ability to take precautions to prevent certain losses, (2)
each party's knowledge about the relevant risks and precautions,
(3) each party's ability to acquire further knowledge, (4) each
party's degree of risk-aversion, (5) each party's access to insurance,
and (6) the transaction costs involved in enforcing each of the possible obligations-to list just a few of the relevant factors. Often,
some of these factors will point in favor of enforcing relatively
stringent obligations, while others will argue in the opposite
direction.
Indeed, these factors are often analyzed in the economic literature on optimal default rules. As noted earlier, the selection of default rules for parties whose contract is silent has much in common
with the task of selecting reasonable obligations for parties who
have not properly consented."' Thus, economists have attempted
to identify the most efficient remedy for nonperformance, 9 or the
most efficient limits on a seller's responsibility for unexpected diffi-

13 See Section I.A.3.
For non-technical introductions to this literature, see Robert Cooter and Thomas
Ulen, Law and Economics 288-316 (Harper Collins, 1988); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics chs 5, 8 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser,
An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U Colo L Rev 683
(1986); Craswell, 61 S Cal L Rev 629 (cited in note 22).
3'
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culties, 40 or the most efficient allocation of liability in products liability cases. 41 Unfortunately, this literature is often inconclusive.
As Duncan Kennedy once remarked, "It all depends on empirical
data that no one ever seems to have ready to hand."42
To be sure, in many cases the economic analysis may be easy.
A warranty that lasts for only thirty seconds is surely inefficient; a
rule prohibiting customers from recovering for damage they deliberately inflict on their own automobiles is surely efficient. Where
the issues are as simple as these, an efficiency criterion may be
applied with a high level of confidence. In other cases, the application of an efficiency criterion is harder-but in these cases, most of
the alternatives to an efficiency criterion are equally difficult to apply. Moreover, the alternatives generate other problems of their
own, as the remaining portions of this section will illustrate.
b)

Alternative cost-benefit tests. The efficiency criterion

is often criticized on normative grounds because it measures buyers' benefits by their willingness to pay. This is problematic because a buyer's willingness to pay depends in part on how much
money a buyer has, how much he knows about the importance of
the term in question, and what he has been socialized to value.43
For example, if a buyer incorrectly believes that a product's failure
rate is low, and is therefore unwilling to pay very much for extended warranty protection, few would say that extended warranty
protection would not benefit this buyer. It seems equally odd to
say that a poor buyer, who cannot afford to pay very much for an
extended warranty, would therefore receive only a small benefit if
he were given one.
This objection suggests an alternative criterion under which
benefits would be evaluated by buyers' willingness to pay under

10

See, for example, Posner and Rosenfield, 6 J Legal Stud 83 (cited in note 22). Recent

contributions to this literature include Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract
Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J Legal Stud 353 (1988); Alan 0.
Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J Legal
Stud 43 (1990); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts:An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and JudicialStrategies, 21 J Legal Stud 271 (1992).
41 For a recent, non-technical survey of this literature, see Schwartz, 97 Yale L J 353
(cited in note 22).
42 Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law,
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 Md L
Rev 563, 603 (1982).
43 For examples of these criticisms, see Mark Kehnan, A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies 141-50 (Harvard, 1987); C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law,
8 Hofstra L Rev 939 (1980); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan L Rev 387 (1981).
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more ideal circumstances, rather than by their actual willingness to
pay. For example, we could ask how much a buyer would have paid
for an extended warranty if he had known the correct odds of
product failure, or how much the buyer would have paid for an
extended warranty if he were not so poor. Indeed, welfare economists routinely make the first sort of correction, and evaluate benefits from the standpoint of a fully informed buyer. While it is less
conventional to evaluate benefits from the standpoint of buyers
who have more money, or who have been differently socialized,
there is no reason in principle why these corrections could not be
made.44 Notice that such corrections strengthen the case for applying a liability rule rather than leaving the selection of terms to X's
market incentives, 45 for alternative criteria such as these entail a
larger set of "market failures." As even competitive markets respond only to the demand expressed by consumers' actual willingness to pay, market incentives may frequently lead X to choose
terms which are less than ideal from the standpoint of these alternative criteria.
Using these alternative substantive criteria under a liability
rule creates two additional problems, however. First, these criteria
will generally be at least as hard to apply as the traditional efficiency test based on actual willingness to pay. Under the alternative criteria considered here, the court must answer all the same
questions as under the traditional economic approach, but it must
answer them from the standpoint of a hypothetical or idealized
buyer, not from the standpoint of actual buyers. Even hypothetical
buyers usually care about how much better terms would cost.
Thus, a court applying this test must still worry about the effect of
more favorable terms on each side's ability to take precautions, on
each side's ability to get insurance, and so on. This does little to
ease the administrative difficulties associated with a more traditional efficiency test.
The second problem stems directly from this use of hypothetical buyers as the normative benchmark. To see the problem, suppose that richer or better-informed buyers would indeed consider a
longer warranty to be worth more than its cost. If nothing is done
4, A closely related issue-the extent to which "hypothetical consent" theories should
idealize the parties whose hypothetical consent is being considered-is discussed in Charny,
89 Mich L Rev at 1820-21 (cited in note 11). See also Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs
ch 8 (Cambridge, 1992).
45 The choice between protecting Y with a liability rule and simply enforcing the contract as written (thus leaving the selection of terms to X's market incentives) is discussed in
Section I.C.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:1

to cure actual buyers' poverty or lack of information, they will continue to act according to their actual preferences, not the preferences they would have if they were richer or better informed. As a
result, at least some of these buyers may refuse to buy the product
at all once the longer warranty has been added and the product's
price has risen. In short, while the market may not perform very
well relative to these alternative cost-benefit criteria, courts that
do not have power to regulate sellers' prices are not likely to perform very well either.46
To be sure, the possibility that some buyers might be priced
out of the market is not necessarily bad, if buyers would be better
off not buying the product in question. For example, if the product
is an extremely risky one that would not be purchased by perfectly-informed buyers, and if a longer warranty would force the
seller to increase the product's price to reflect those risks, the resulting reduction in sales might be defended on efficiency grounds
once we adopt the values of a fully-informed buyer. This is the
familiar "level of activity" effect analyzed by Steven Shavell.4 7 For
many products, however-and especially for those products
deemed "necessities"-it is surely the case that buyers would be
better off purchasing the product than not purchasing at all. For
these products, the possibility that some buyers might be priced
out of the market must be taken into account.
It could of course be argued that the full amount of sellers'
48
costs are not always passed on to buyers through higher prices. If
the price increase is less than the sellers' costs, however, then some
41 The problem discussed in this paragraph is thus an example of a "second best" problem, which would disappear only if the underlying problem (poverty or lack of information)
could be addressed directly. For a technical analysis of similar second-best problems, see
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Workmen's Compensation and OccupationalSafety Under Imperfect
Information, 71 Am Econ Rev 80 (1981). For a less technical discussion, see Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distributionin Buyer-Seller Relationships,43 Stan L Rev 361, 391-98 (1991).
47 Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J Legal Stud 1 (1980).
48 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of
the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income RedistributionPolicy, 80 Yale
L J 1093 (1971). The Ackerman article, and its suggestion that sellers' costs might not always be passed on, produced a flurry of academic responses. Responses focusing particularly
on the housing industry include Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the
Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 Yale L J 1175 (1973);
Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor
Komesar, 82 Yale L J 1194 (1973); Werner Z. Hirsch, Joel G. Hirsch, and Stephen Margolis,
Regression Analysis of the Effects of HabitabilityLaws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 Cal L Rev 1098 (1975). More general theoretical
discussions include Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev 361 (cited in note 46); Kennedy, 41 Md L Rev
at 598, 604-14 (cited in note 42); Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative
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buyers must be unwilling or unable to pay the full amount of sellers' costs. Under extreme configurations of supply and demand,
sellers' prices might not rise any more than the value placed on the
more favorable terms by the lowest-valuing buyer, thereby assuring that all other buyers will either gain or (at worst) break even
from obtaining the more favorable terms at a higher price. 4 More
commonly, though, the gain to those buyers who would have paid
more than the actual price increase for the more favorable terms
comes at the expense of those buyers who did not value the
favorable terms as much, or who simply could not afford to pay a
higher price for them. In that case, the benefit to buyers who get
the favorable terms at a relatively low price will have to be balanced against not just the cost to sellers, but also against (a) the
cost to buyers who still buy the product but who would rather give
up the more favorable terms and pay a lower price, and (b) the
cost to buyers who are priced out of the market by the price increase. Moreover, the buyers who are priced out of the market will
often be those who are the poorest, least well-informed, or most
heavily socialized to place little value on the contract term in question. If so, the costs of the favorable terms will fall most heavily on
the very groups this alternative criterion is intended to protect.5 0
c) Pure paternalism.Similar problems arise if we abandon the effort to measure the value of contract terms by the preferences of buyers-either actual buyers, or hypothetical buyers in
some more ideal world-and instead evaluate obligations according
to some wholly external standard. For example, certain contractual

Efficiency, and Overall Desirabilityof Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 Harv L Rev 1815 (1976).
" All buyers will gain or break even from inefficient terms only if (1) the supply of the
product is absolutely fixed, so that sellers do not reduce the quantity offered for sale; and
(2) buyers' willingness to pay for the underlying product correlates exactly with their willingness to pay for the inefficient term, so that those buyers willing to pay the least for the
extra term are also those willing to pay the least for the product itself. For discussions of
these conditions see, for example, Ackerman, 80 Yale L J at 1102-08 (cited in note 48);
Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 380-83 (cited in note 46).
50 See Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 372-85 (cited in note 46). Note, too, that sellers'
ability to charge a higher price under a liability rule removes one objection that is often
raised against liability rules in the context of property or nuisance law. In property or nuisance law, X generally does not have any contractual dealings with Y and, therefore, does
not have the opportunity to charge a higher price to make up for her liability. This means
that the amount of damages awarded under a liability rule will determine the distribution of
wealth between X and Y, which may create incentives for strategic behavior prior to the
actual taking. See note 12. In contractual relationships, by contrast, X's ability to raise or
lower her price will tend to neutralize the distributional effects of a liability rule.
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rights might be viewed as pure "merit goods," or rights that all
buyers ought to have regardless of whether any buyer considers
them to be worth their cost. Most merit-good arguments lead to
the conclusion that the rights in question should be inalienable,
even by properly-consenting parties. A slightly more moderate approach would allow the rights in question to be waived by parties
who properly consent to the waiver, but would require that parties
whose proper consent could not practicably be obtained be treated
as though -they had not waived those rights. In other words, a
merit-good argument could supply the substantive standard for
evaluating contested obligations wherever a liability rule is appropriate, without overriding cases of actual consent. 1
Unfortunately, this approach raises problems very similar to
those just discussed. In any case where a liability rule is appropriate, most parties will be equally unable to give proper consent to
any other terms, so the effect will be much the same as if the terms
adopted under the merit-good standard had been, made
mandatory. 52 Moreover, while the merit-good analyst may consider
his or her selected terms to be well worth the extra price, if buyers
cannot be induced to share the analyst's perspective they may
stubbornly refuse to pay the higher price. If so, the use of substantive criteria not linked to buyers' actual preferences will again end
up pricing some buyers out of the market, thus raising all the
problems discussed in the preceding subsection. In some cases, of
course, the merit-good analyst might believe that it is better for
buyers to do without the product, rather than purchase it without
the meritorious terms. For many goods, though-and especially for
"necessities"-the argument that buyers would be better off without the product is difficult to defend.
More fundamentally, any merit-good argument requires some
substantive test by which the merit of any proposed merit good
can be assessed. That is, the merit-good analyst must be able to
say why certain contract terms are meritorious, and why their
merit outweighs any higher prices that may accompany them. The
analyst might of course defend his or her chosen terms by using
one of the substantive criteria already discussed in this section.
For example, the analyst might argue that the benefits of the chosen terms outweigh their extra costs when benefits are evaluated
51 This use of merit-good arguments, and its relation to paternalism, is discussed in
Charny, 89 Mich L Rev at 1832-34 (cited in note 11).
51 Thus, most of this section's discussion of substantive criteria would apply a fortiori

to non-waivable rules or inalienable entitlements. See note 8.
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either by actual consumer preferences or by those of ideal consumers. If the analyst takes this position, however, the merit-good argument adds nothing to the two substantive criteria already
discussed.
To provide a distinctive substantive criterion, the merit-good
analyst must have a theory of merit that does not depend on consumer preferences (either actual or ideal). In effect, the analyst
needs a theory of the "just term," analogous to medieval theories
of the "just price." However, such theories are notoriously difficult
to develop and defend, and few such theories have been put forward in the contracts literature.5 3 The principle of free contract is
by now so widely accepted that most modern observers would regard almost any term adopted with each party's full consent as
just. As a result, when modern observers are forced to select contract terms on behalf of parties who are unable to consent, it is
difficult to find any substantive criteria to fall back upon other
than criteria based on the parties' own preferences, either actual or
ideal. It is easy to imagine specific benefits which a merit-good analyst might put forward as having value independently of parties'
actual preferences-for example, the value of being protected
against crushing losses that would leave one unable to pursue one's
life projects. It is harder to suggest any non-preference-based criterion for deciding whether or when such a benefit is worth whatever
price the parties would have to pay.
d) Reasonable expectations. A different approach would
evaluate the content of possible obligations by testing them against
the expectations of the other party to the contract. This is the essence of the "reasonable expectations" doctrine often applied to
insurance contracts and, with increasing frequency, to other standard form contracts as well. 4 An analogous expectations-based criterion is sometimes used in products liability cases, where courts

'3 For discussions of the difficulties inherent in "just price" or "just term" theories, see
F. H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness,19 Hofstra L Rev 33 (1990); Randy
E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum L Rev 269, 283-86 (1986). See also
Gordley, 69 Cal L Rev 1587 (cited in note 36).
" For discussions of this doctrine, see Robert E. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv L Rev 961, 961-77 (1970); Kenneth S. Abraham,
Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of
the Insured, 67 Va L Rev 1151 (1981); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract:
The Transformationof Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U Pitt L Rev 21 (1984). The
reasonable expectations doctrine is discussed at more length in Section II.B.3.
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determine whether a product is defective by asking whether it provides the level of safety that a reasonable consumer would expect. 55
However, a standard based on "reasonable expectations" is
ambiguous between two very different concepts: what parties actually expect, and what it would be reasonable for them to expect.
The problems with any expectations-based standard depend on
just how this ambiguity is resolved. If reasonable expectations are
defined by whatever parties actually expect-a kind of social science fact-then, in principle, such expectations could be discovered by psychological tests or consumer surveys. In many cases,
though, the contested obligation concerns some relatively unlikely
contingency that most parties would not consciously consider prior
to purchase. In these cases, presuming that the parties have any
expectations at all (and then attempting to "discover" those expectations through tests or surveys after the fact) is more than a little
problematic. 6
Partly for this reason, the ambiguity in the concept of "reasonable expectations" is often resolved in favor of a normative interpretation based on what would be reasonable for consumers to
expect. This normative conception avoids the difficulties associated
with consumer tests and surveys, but it introduces other difficulties
associated with whichever normative criterion is used to decide
what expectations would be reasonable. For example, if it is decided that buyers -should reasonably expect efficient contract
terms, but should not have to be on their guard against inefficient
terms, the reasonable expectations approach reduces to the efficiency analysis described earlier. If some other substantive criterion is used to decide what expectations are reasonable, the reasonable expectations approach reduces to whichever substantive
criterion is adopted.
Significantly, when courts employ a "reasonable expectations"
standard they usually end up invoking some other substantive criterion to give content to that standard. In insurance law, for example, when the substance of an insurance contract seems otherwise
reasonable to the courts, they generally rule that reasonable consumers should have expected the contested terms. When the substance of the contract seems unreasonable to the courts, they rule

55 Barker v Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal 3d 413, 134 Cal Rptr 225, 573 P2d 443,
452 (1978).

56 But not without its defenders. For a recent defense of an approach to the selection of
default rules which looks to the parties' "tacit assumptions," see Barnett, 78 Va L Rev 821
(cited in note 11).
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that the unreasonable terms could not have been reasonably expected by consumers.5 7 Similarly, in products liability law many
courts have adopted an efficiency test to define what consumers
may reasonably expect, by ruling that a reasonable consumer is entitled to expect exactly the level of safety it would be efficient for
sellers to provide.5 s As one commentator concluded, "[b]urdening a
product defect analysis with the conceptual baggage of the hypothetical ordinary consumer adds essentially nothing of substance to
a straightforward risk-utility balancing approach."5 9
In short, judicial reliance on such ambiguous phrases as "reasonable expectations" or "substantive unconscionability" has done
little to advance our understanding of the substantive criteria
courts might use in evaluating challenged obligations under a liability rule. The efficiency criterion continues to receive a good deal
of attention, both from its supporters and its critics, but alternatives to an efficiency criterion remain woefully undeveloped. The
remaining two subsections document this problem in more detail
by examining a recurring substantive issue: the trade-off between
higher prices and more favorable terms.
3.

Higher prices vs. more favorable terms.

The economic literature on unconscionability has often noted
that requiring more favorable terms might make products unduly
expensive. For example, Arthur Leff analogized the regulation of
contract terms to the regulation of product quality, warning that
"[i]n certain situations that would have the same effect as some
building codes: the cheapest one can get is more expensive than
one can afford. ' 60 This concern provides one rationale for evaluating the merits of contested obligations according to an efficiency
criterion, under which the amount buyers gain from more
favorable terms is measured by their willingness to pay. If the buy-

57 See Abraham, 67 Va L Rev at 1166 (cited in note 54) ("[T]he courts are concerned
much more with the substance of coverage than with the expectations of the insured."). See
also the text accompanying notes 112-13.
518Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand L Rev 593, 614-18 (1980).
'9 Id at 615.
60 Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am U L Rev 131, 155 (1970). Most other
writers who approach unconscionability from an economic perspective have made similar
observations. See Buckley, 19 Hofstra L Rev at 62-63 (cited in note 53); Epstein, 18 J L &
Econ at 305-15 (cited in note 6); M. J. Trebilcock, The Doctrineof Inequality of Bargaining
Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U Toronto L J 359, 381-84
(1976).
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ers' willingness to pay exceeds the sellers' losses, the accompanying
price increase will never exceed the buyers' willingness to pay, so
61
buyers should never be priced out of the market.
Strangely, this trade-off between more favorable terms and
higher prices is almost completely disregarded in most non-economic analyses of unconscionability. For example, Todd Rakoff's
otherwise comprehensive article relegates Leff's concern, and the
choice between less favorable terms and higher prices generally, to
a single sentence in a footnote. 2 This trade-off between more
favorable terms and higher prices is also ignored in the
more exe4
8
tensive writings of John Murray and David Slawson.
While several explanations for this lacuna are possible, I suggest that it may result from a failure to appreciate the difference
between property rules and liability rules. That is, the choice between less favorable terms and higher prices can indeed be ignored
as long as the unconscionabilityproblem in question is one that
can appropriately be governed by a property rule. For example,
suppose that X's contract clearly states that the warranty lasts for
only three days-but suppose that X stops Y from reading the
contract by lying about its contents, assuring him that the warranty lasts for three years. As X can remove this impediment simply by not lying, lies-like classic gun-to-the-head duress-are
good candidates for the application of a property rule. Moreover, a
property rule allows the court to refuse to enforce X's three-day
limit without having to decide whether a longer warranty would be
worth the higher price X would have to charge. Under a property
rule, if X wants to enforce any particular time limit she must negotiate with Y directly, without misleading him. As long as there are
no other impediments to proper consent, Y can then decide for
himself whether a longer warranty is worth whatever price X
would charge for it, thus freeing the court from this decision. In

01

See Craswell, 43 Stan L Rev at 372-84 (cited in note 46).

Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv L Rev
1173, 1208 n 125 (1983) ("Leff's fear that government will consistently err on the side of
socializing too many risks ... seems to me unsubstantiated.").
03 John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U Pitt L Rev 1
(1969); Roundtable Discussion of Unconscionability,Etcetera,31 U Pitt L Rev 547 (1970);
John E. Murray, Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About
Incipient Unconscionability,39 U Pitt L Rev 597 (1978); John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 Cornell L
Rev 735 (1982).
" Slawson, 46 U Pitt L Rev 21 (cited in note 54); W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv L Rev 529 (1971); W.
David Slawson, Mass Contracts:Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S Cal L Rev 1 (1974).
'2
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short, wherever a property rule can be employed, economists' instinctive concern with the trade-off between more favorable terms
and lower prices can safely be ignored by the courts.
Significantly, many of the writers who do not address this
trade-off implicitly assume that they are analyzing a case where a
property rule can be employed. The following excerpt is
illustrative:
A seller of a product which is accompanied by a standard
form can make a buyer's expectations on any point as clear as
the seller wants them to be. The seller could clearly advertise
what a buyer should expect, for example, or he could clearly
state what the buyer was getting in a standard form which the
seller took steps to insure was actually read and understood
by the buyer before the buyer entered into the purchase
contract.6s
As long as the seller can achieve this goal at a sufficiently low cost
for every term she might someday wish to enforce, the courts can
protect buyers with a property rule.
If, however, it is prohibitively expensive to achieve such clarity
with respect to every term the seller might want to enforce, a different analysis is required. The seller's failure to achieve such clarity can still be treated as invalidating the buyer's proper consent-I take no position on that question here-but now the law's
response must take the form of a liability rule rather than a property rule. Under a liability rule, the court will be choosing enforceable terms on behalf of parties who, by hypothesis, cannot practicably give their own consent to all of the terms in question.
Whenever the court must select terms for parties who cannot give
their own consent, the trade-off between more favorable terms and
higher prices can no longer be ignored.
5 Slawson, 48 S Cal L Rev at 21-22 (cited in note 64)(footnote omitted). A similar

assumption is sometimes made even by those who approach unconscionability from an economic perspective, as the following excerpt illustrates:
Under current contract and commercial law, the existence of imperfect information is a
necessary but generally not sufficient condition for legal intervention. An additional
prerequisite is the existence of substantively unfair contract terms. The argument to
this point, however, shows that imperfect information should constitute a sufficient
ground for intervention.
Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Interveningin Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 630, 639 (1979) (footnote omitted;
emphasis added). If Schwartz and Wilde mean that courts can "intervene" without any
analysis of the substance of the challenged contract terms, they must be relying on an assumption similar to that stated in the text.
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Reliance on pre-existing default rules.

The reluctance of many analysts to address this trade-off may
also be due to the belief that whenever proper consent to some
clause is lacking, the courts can simply treat the contract as though
it were silent on that point. As noted earlier, 6 when a contract
fails to address certain points, the law often provides a governing
"default rule." These same default rules could also be used to govern cases where one party's form purports to address some topic,
but without the other party's proper consent.67 Using pre-existing
default rules in this way might seem to eliminate the need for
courts to select their own substantive criterion for deciding which
obligations are reasonable and which are not. In particular, it
might free courts from having to decide which favorable terms are
worth a higher price.
However, this apparent advantage is largely illusory. First, default rules are not always chosen for their reasonableness. As Ayres
and Gertner put it, some default rules are "penalty defaults"
which were never intended to be left in force, but were instead
designed to induce one party or the other to specify their wishes
more explicitly.68 For example, if a contract for a credit sale is silent about whether the seller retains a security interest in the good
sold, the default rule is that no such security interest is created. 9
Surely this default rule was not selected because the drafters
thought that security interests were unreasonable, or that most
buyers would prefer to make an unsecured purchase at a higher
price. Instead, the function of this default rule is merely to induce
sellers who want security interests to explicitly provide for them.
An explicit specification removes any doubt about the seller's
wishes by clearly signalling her intent, both to the buyer and to
any subsequent reviewing court.
Penalty default rules such as these should not be used as the
standard of substantive reasonableness under a liability rule. If a
liability rule is being applied, it must be because most sellers have
no practicable way of obtaining buyers' proper consent to certain
66 See Section I.A.3.

'7 For examples of this argument, see Rakoff, 96 Harv L Rev at 1181-83, 1209-10 (cited
in note 62); Slawson, 46 U Pitt L Rev at 45-46 (cited in note 54); Robert Dugan, The Application of Substantive Unconscionability to Standardized Contracts-A Systematic Approach, 18 New England L Rev 77, 87-95 (1982-83).
"8See text accompanying notes 22-25.
19 The UCC does create an implied security interest in certain circumstances, but these
are not relevant to the situation described in the text. See § 2-507(2), § 2-711(3) (ALI 1972).
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terms. If the courts respond to this lack of consent by enforcing
the "no security interest" default rule, the product will have to be
sold without a security interest or not be sold at all. This outcome
might be justifiable if the courts or legislature had already determined that most buyers would be better off paying a higher price
and taking the product free of a security interest or else not buying
the product at all. As discussed above, though, the "no security
interest" default rule reflects no such judicial or legislative determination. This is why courts should not evaluate the reasonableness of a contested obligation by a pre-existing penalty default
rule.
Of course, not all default rules are penalty default rules. When
a pre-existing default rule does reflect a judicial or legislative determination that most buyers would prefer to pay a higher price
for more favorable terms, courts may well be able to treat a clause
that was not properly consented to as though the contract were
silent on that point, thus bringing the pre-existing default rule into
play. However, this use of default rules still requires some court or
governmental agency to address the trade-off between more
favorable terms and higher prices. If the default rule emerged from
judicial precedent, we need confidence that the judges who created
the precedent analyzed the relevant trade-off, and analyzed it correctly. If the default rule was created legislatively, we need a similar confidence in the analysis of the legislature. In short, the availability of a pre-existing default rule at most shifts the locus of the
substantive evaluation required to implement a liability rule.
The fact that a liability rule requires this substantive evaluation to be performed somewhere by somebody is central to the
choice between property rules and liability rules. As discussed in
Section I.A, the principal drawback of a property rule is that it
requires each party to obtain the other's proper consent, which
may sometimes be impracticable, or even impossible (depending on
the requirements of proper consent). However, the principal drawback of a liability rule is that it requires the courts-or, we might
now add, it requires somebody-to decide which obligations are
reasonable and which are not. The more difficult it is for courts
and other agencies to conduct this evaluation, and the greater the
harm that would result from an erroneous evaluation, the more the
balance tips in favor of property rules rather than liability rules.
However, a third alternative must also be considered. If the
costs of a substantive evaluation are too high to make a liability
rule attractive, but the costs of obtaining proper consent are too
high to make a property rule attractive, the third possibility is to
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lower the requirements for obtaining "proper" consent. That is,
the court could simply enforce the contract as written, by finding
that Y's consent was properly obtained.
To assess the advantages and disadvantages of this approach,
we must now look more closely at the definition of proper consent.
The following section argues that the rules for determining
whether Y properly consented should depend on whether the nextbest alternative involves a property rule or a liability rule. In terms
of the decision tree depicted in Figure 1, the initial choice between
the upper and lower path should depend in part on just to which
option the lower path will lead.
C.

Defining "Proper" Consent

Most theories of what I have called proper consent focus on
the voluntariness of the actor's choice, and the actor's knowledge
about the consequences of his choice. However, the concepts of
"voluntariness" and "adequate knowledge" are notoriously difficult
to define. Compare the following cases:
(1) Y is healthy, but X threatens to shoot Y unless he agrees
to have his leg amputated.
(2) Y is drowning (through no one's fault), and X refuses to
rescue him unless he agrees to have his leg amputated.
(3) Y's leg is injured in an accident (through no one's fault),
and he will die unless he agrees to let X amputate his leg.
In each case, Y's choice to have his leg amputated is "voluntary" in
the sense that X prefers that choice to the only available alternative. Yet all would release Y from his choice in case (1), many
would release him in case (2), and no one would release him in case
(3).
Philosophers have offered several theories to distinguish cases
such as these.7° For example, it could be argued that Y's choice is
coerced, or his consent is not "proper," if and only if the alternative to accepting X's offer would make X worse off relative to a
baseline defined by Y's moral or legal rights (for example, a right
not to be shot).7 1 Under this approach, Y's choice is clearly coerced
in case (1), and the voluntariness of his choice in case (2) depends

70 See generally Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton, 1987); J. Roland Pennock and
John W. Chapman, eds, Coercion (Aldine-Atherton, 1972).
1 See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes and Morton
White, eds, Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel 440 (St.
Martin's, 1969).
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on whether Y has a legal or moral right to be rescued by X. Other
baselines are also possible-for example, whether the alternative to
accepting X's offer leaves Y worse off than Y had expected X to
leave him before he learned of X's actual proposal, or worse off
than most people in Y's position would be left by most X's. 7 2 Other
theories invalidate Y's consent only when X affirmatively causes
the condition that make the alternative unattractive to Y (though
not necessarily by violating Y's rights), thus requiring some distinction between affirmatively causing harm and merely failing to
73
prevent it.
In the legal literature, those who oppose judicial invalidation
of contracts usually do so by defending one of the more easily satisfied philosophical theories of consent, while those who support
judicial intervention do so on the basis of one of the more demanding theories. 7 4 My contention, though, is that whichever philosophical theory one accepts is irrelevant to deciding whether a contract
ought to be enforced whenever the alternative to enforcement is a
liability rule. Liability rules do nothing to change Y's alternative
to whatever terms the court deems reasonable. Thus, if Y's only
alternative is so bad that it invalidates his consent to X's contract,
it should also invalidate his consent to the terms selected by the
court.
For example, suppose that X has a monopoly over some important product, and uses that monopoly to force a high price or
some other burdensome contract term on Y. It might then be
asked whether Y's choice between accepting X's terms or doing
72 Wertheimer, Coercion at 207 (cited in note 70) (referring to these alternative baselines as the "phenomenological" and "statistical" respectively).
'" For discussions of tests incorporating this standard as one element,. see David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 Phil & Pub Aff 121 (1981); Lawrence A. Alexander, Zimmerman on Coercive Wage Offers, 12 Phil & Pub Aff 160 (1983); David Zimmerman, More
on Coercive Wage Offers: A Reply to Alexander, 12 Phil & Pub Aff 165 (1983).
There are also instrumental or utilitarian theories of consent. For example, some economists have objected to duress not because it violates the victim's rights but because it gives
victims an incentive to improve their powers of self-defense, triggering an "arms race" which
ultimately benefits neither side. See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 254-56 (cited
in note 39); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 Western Econ J 224, 228-31 (1967).
74 Explicit discussions of these theories in the legal literature include Charles Fried,
Contract as Promise ch 7 (Harvard, 1981); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of
Contract ch 3 (Harvard, forthcoming 1993) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Scott Altman, Divorcing Threats and Offers (unpublished manuscript, 1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev);
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemprary Contract Theory, 10 Cardozo L Rev 1077 (1989); Epstein, 18
J L & Econ at 295-97 (cited in note 6); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L J 472, 495-97 (1980).
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without the product make Y's consent to X's terms less than truly
voluntary. If the absence of an alternative supply is deemed to invalidate Y's consent, Y can hardly be protected with a property
rule, for that would prevent X from ever making an enforceable
contract with Y (or with anyone else). Instead, if X's monopoly
invalidates Y's consent, Y will have to be protected with a liability
rule. Under a liability rule, X may be prevented from enforcing an
unreasonable price or other unreasonable terms, but she will still
be allowed to insist on prices and terms that a reviewing court
deems reasonable.
In such a case, the legal definition of consent will not affect
the voluntariness of Y's decision. If the law refuses to recognize X's
monopoly as invalidating Y's consent, Y will be left with a choice
between doing without the product in question or accepting X's
terms. If the law does recognize X's monopoly as invalidating Y's
consent, Y will be left with a choice between doing without the
product or accepting whatever terms the court deems reasonable.
Thus, no matter how the law defines consent, Y will still be put to
a choice between accepting terms drafted by someone else, or doing without an essential product. The only effect of the definition
of proper ,consent is to determine whose terms Y has a choice of
accepting: terms drafted by X, or terms approved by the court.
Notice that this argument does not apply when the alternative
to enforcing the contract is protecting Y with a property rule.
Whenever a property rule is an appropriate response-typically, in
cases where X can eliminate the alleged impediment to proper consent-judicial intervention can change the quality of Y's consent,
by inducing X to remove the impediment. Thus, whenever a property rule can be used, the philosophical theories described above
may well be relevant to deciding which of those impediments that
can be removed ought to be removed. Significantly, though, many
of these philosophical theories identify impediments which cannot
be removed by the other party: impediments such as the absence
of any alternative rescuers, or the victim's poverty. As these impediments will still be present even if the court substitutes its own

75 See Slawson, 48 S Cal L Rev at 47-48 (cited in note 64) ("When General Motors
Corporation deals with me, it will always have the superior bargaining power. If disparity of
bargaining power were sufficient to invalidate a contract, General Motors and I could never
make a valid contract."). A property rule might be justified if the law sought to break up
monopolies wherever they existed, a process which could be encouraged by refusing to enforce any contracts made by a monopolist-but the law has never taken so strong an antimonopoly stance. See note 97 (discussing the possibility of a similar policy toward horizontal collusion).

1993]

PropertyRules and Liability Rules

terms for those of the original contract, the victim's consent will be
equally invalid (under these theories) whether the court intervenes
or not. The invalidity of the buyer's consent therefore gives no basis for choosing between enforcing the contract as written and protecting the victim with a liability rule.
1.

Political process values.

It might be argued that the law's definition of consent should
take account of a different set of philosophical values: the values
served by judicial or political processes, rather than the values
served by private consent. That is, as coupling a liability rule with
a more stringent definition of consent will result in more obligations being selected by the court rather than by X, it might be
argued that Y's ability to participate in the judicial process serves
an important process value. Similarly, if the substantive evaluations required under a liability rule are made by a legislature, it
might be argued that Y participated in the legislative decision
through the electoral process, and that this legislative decision
should be preferred over a simple enforcement of X's terms.7 6 In
other words, if the definition of proper consent under a liability
rule serves only to reallocate decisionmaking authority between X
and some governmental body, the alternative substantive outcomes
are not the only possible bases for choosing between them. Instead,
the process values served by the relevant governmental bodies
might argue in favor of giving the decision to the governmental
body.
However, the choice is not simply a choice between democratically-chosen terms and terms unilaterally drafted by X. Many governmental institutions are far from democratic, and even terms
drafted "unilaterally" by X are in reality the result of a complex
interplay of private and governmental forces.77 Thus, whether the

76 For a suggestion of an argument along these lines, see Rakoff, 96 Harv L Rev at
1238-43 (cited in note 62); Slawson, 84 Harv L Rev at 533-37 (cited in note 64). The argument that Y directly participates in the judicial process is of course somewhat attenuated in
this day of class actions and mass litigation, especially when one considers the possible precedential effect of one litigated case on the standardized forms used by thousands of other
consumers not party to the litigation. Nonetheless, the decisions of the courts and litigators
still might serve political process goals under some theory of indirect representation as applied to the litigation process. For a review of these theories, see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 NYU L Rev 193 (1992).
77 As a number of authors have noted, even the "unregulated market" reflects a large
degree of state activity to define property rights, police against theft, enforce contracts, and
so on. See, for example, Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv L Rev 553 (1933);
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enforceable obligations are selected by X or by a federal regulatory
agency, every Y will still have played some role in the political
processes which permitted that obligation to be selected, but the
role played by most Y's will have been extremely remote. I know of
no process-based theory sufficiently fine-tuned to make an argument for either of these highly attenuated roles over the other on
the basis of either's contribution to personhood or autonomy.
2.

Incentives and institutional competence.

How, then, should the law define "proper" consent in cases in
which invalidating X's contract would trigger a liability rule? My
suggestion is that philosophical theories about the validity of Y's
consent can at most supply a necessary but not sufficient condition
for invalidating X's contract. To invalidate X's contract, it should
also be necessary (and perhaps even sufficient) to believe the terms
the courts will enforce are superior to X's terms, according to
whatever criterion of substantive reasonableness one adopts. 78 In
other words, the decision should ultimately rest on a comparison
between the incentives and expertise governing X's choice of
terms, and the incentives and expertise governing the court's. (I
will refer to these factors collectively as considerations of "institutional competence.")
For example, if X has a monopoly and Y is contesting the
price X charged, economic theory provides many reasons for suspecting that X's price will not be efficient. This suggests that if
economic efficiency is accepted as the relevant substantive criterion, the authority to set prices should be given to the courts
rather than to X. In that case, X's monopoly should be treated as
invalidating Y's consent, triggering a liability rule and allowing a
court to review the price's reasonableness.
There may, however, be reasons to think that judicial regulation of prices is more likely to aggravate matters. As noted earlier,
the record of local regulatory agencies in this regard does not inspire confidence. If we do not expect courts to adequately set
prices, we should be more reluctant to treat X's monopoly as invalidating Y's proper consent. That is, even if philosophical theories
of voluntariness would not recognize Y's consent as valid, the law
ought to enforce X's contract anyway, rather than allowing the
Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L
Rev 711 (1980).
71 See Section I.B.2.
79 See note 36.
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courts to enforce an equally involuntary but substantively worse
price. In short, a showing that Y's consent was in some respect
improper may perhaps be a necessary condition for invalidating
X's contract, but it can hardly be sufficient.
Indeed, it is far from clear that the involuntariness of Y's consent should even be a necessary condition for invalidating X's contract. Suppose, for example, that X has a monopoly over some
product, but that it is no real hardship for Y to do without the
product rather than agree to X's terms. Suppose, though, that we
are also convinced that judicially-determined prices will be substantively better than those picked by the monopolist. Can the monopolist nonetheless claim a moral right to enforce her price, as
long as Y's agreement to that price was valid under all of the philosophical theories of consent? (Is the regulation of cable television
rates morally illegitimate because cable television is not a necessity?) The growth of economic regulation over the last sixty years
makes this absolute libertarian constraint difficult to defend. But if
this constraint is rejected, the ability of courts to set superior
prices becomes both a necessary and a sufficient condition for invalidating X's contract. That is, X's monopoly should be treated as
invalidating Y's consent if and only if we think courts can do a
better job at setting prices than X can. Once this view is accepted,
the definition of proper consent depends entirely on the relative
incentives and institutional expertise.
The case for defining "proper consent" on the basis of incentives and institutional expertise can be seen even more clearly by
considering an example where X is a monopolist and Y has challenged some non-price term, such as the scope of X's warranty.
Most philosophical theories of voluntariness would investigate the
validity of Y's consent without considering which terms X objects
to. However, the ability of courts to improve on X's non-price
terms is likely to be less than their ability to improve on X's
prices, for monopolists do not have as many incentives to distort
the non-price terms of their contracts. Indeed, the monopolist's incentive is normally to offer the most attractive non-price terms she
can think of, the better to gouge her customers by charging them
an even higher price.
To be sure, in some cases a less efficient non-price term might
alter the pattern of demand in a way that increases the monopolist's profits, thus giving her an incentive to use a less efficient non-
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price term.80 In these cases, however, the term that maximizes her
profits may actually be more generous to consumers than an efficient term would be (though it will be coupled with an extremely
high price), so it is not necessarily the most unfavorable non-price
terms that ought to be challenged under this rationale."' More important, even when a monopolist does have an incentive to select
inefficient non-price terms, altering the monopolist's non-price
terms without altering her ability to charge a monopoly price will
82
not necessarily leave her customers better off.
Given these difficulties, it would not be implausible to decide
that courts should not attempt to improve on a monopolist's nonprice terms in cases where the only impediment to consent is the
seller's monopoly. That is, courts could treat X's monopoly as not
invalidating Y's consent to any of X's non-price terms-even if we
have also concluded that X's monopoly should be treated as invalidating Y's consent to her price terms, because we think courts can
do a better job improving on a monopolist's prices. In other words,
it might make perfect sense to adopt a different definition of
''proper consent" depending on whether a price or a non-price
term is being challenged.
Admittedly, if proper consent is to be defined in so pragmatic
a fashion, it might be better not to call the resulting concept "consent," or at least to qualify it as "consent for legal purposes" or
"consent for purposes of contract law." A very standard view-so
standard that it is rarely stated explicitly-.-holds that true consent
can be defined independently of the consequences the law attaches
8o

For a survey of the economic literature on this point, see Richard Schmalensee, Mar-

ket Structure, Durability,and Quality:A Selective Survey, 17 Econ Inquiry 177 (1979). For
a non-technical discussion, see Kennedy, 41 Md L Rev at 617-18 (cited in note 42).
11 Katz, 21 RAND J Econ at 530-31 (cited in note 29). A similar observation has been
made concerning damage remedies: in some cases, welfare might be improved by forcing
monopolists to accept a lower limit on their damage liability than the monopolists themselves would choose, if a large liquidated damage clause would assist the monopolist in sorting its customers to facilitate profitable price-discrimination. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100 Yale L J 615, 66164 (1990); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L J 729, 744 (1992).
"' Katz, 21 RAND J Econ at 531-33 (cited in note 29). For similar models addressing
the welfare effects of regulating the monopolist's choice of product quality (rather than
"contract quality")-all reaching similarly pessimistic conclusions about the difficulty of determining whether or when such regulations will improve consumer welfare-see David
Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld, and Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and Quality Distortion:
Effects and Remedies, 102 Q J Econ 743 (1987); Eytan Sheshinski, Price, Quality and
Quantity Regulation in Monopoly Situations, 43 Economica 127 (1976); A. Michael Spence,
Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell J Econ 417 (1975).
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to a lack of consent, and that the connection between the two runs
entirely in one direction. That is, on this view the definition of
proper consent may tell us when the law ought to impose certain
consequences, but the consequences the law imposes are not
thought to affect the definition of proper consent. In this traditional view, consent is a primitive concept which can be defined by
a moral theory wholly external to the law.
Whatever terminology is employed, the key point is that "consent for purposes of contract law" is precisely what is at stake in
contracts cases. That is, the ultimate concern of the legal doctrines
analyzed in this paper is not consent as an abstract or ideal concept, but whether consent is lacking in some way that ought to
make the resulting contract unenforceable, thereby triggering the
application of either a property rule or a liability rule. Given this
concern, the definition of consent for purposes of contract law can
legitimately take into account the costs and other difficulties of implementing a property or liability rule. If the law's best response to
some consent problem is a liability rule rather than a property
rule, and if we think courts applying a liability rule would do worse
than X in selecting reasonable obligations, the problem in question
should not be treated as invalidating Y's consent.
3.

Substantive tests in the definition of consent.

One further complication must be introduced. Under some
definitions of consent, the courts may need to evaluate the reasonableness of a contested obligation simply to determine whether Y's
consent was proper. These definitions of consent therefore require
courts to evaluate the substance of the challenged obligation even
if a property rule will govern. This means that the relevance of
incentives and institutional expertise is not limited to those cases
where lack of consent will trigger a liability rule. Whenever a proposed definition of consent requires the court to exercise substantive judgment to decide whether consent is lacking, the demands
placed on the court will be the same regardless of whether a liability rule or a property rule is in force. As a consequence, questions
about the court's institutional expertise will be relevant to deciding
whether to accept the proposed definition of consent.
a) Unreasonable terms as evidence of lack of consent. If
Y's claim that he never consented is based on an impediment to
proper consent that cannot be proved directly, the substantive reasonableness of X's contract terms may be relevant as indirect evidence of the alleged impediment to consent. For exaiple, if Y
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claims that X lied to him but X denies having lied, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the resulting contract might help a
court decide which party to believe. If the contract is so onerous
that few people would agree to it unless they had been tricked,
that makes Y's story more plausible. The unreasonableness of the
resulting contract might also be evidence of some other impediment to proper consent, such as duress or ignorance. Indeed, in
competency cases part of the court's evaluation of competency consists of evaluating the substantive merits of the contract the party
signed."'
Under this approach to identifying the absence of consent, it
is still possible for courts to protect Y with what would nominally
be a property rule. That is, once the court decides that X probably
did lie to Y, the court could refuse to let X enforce any obligations
against Y, even obligations whose substance would otherwise seem
perfectly reasonable. However, if the court invokes this property
rule only after finding (in the course of resolving the conflicting
testimony about X's lie) that X's proposed obligation was not reasonable, the net effect will be very similar to a liability rule. The
court will still have had to incur all the administrative costs associated with evaluating the substance of the proposed obligation.
Moreover, if the court errs in this evaluation, then desirable obligations will be improperly struck down or undesirable obligations
will be improperly enforced.8 4 Thus, questions of institutional competence and expertise are clearly relevant to this approach to defining consent, just as they are to any definition of consent that is
coupled with a liability rule.
b) Unreasonable terms in the definition of proper consent. Under some definitions of proper consent, the substance of
X's terms are relevant as part of the definition of consent, not
merely as indirect evidence of some independently-defined impediment to consent. For example, it is sometimes argued that buyers
who sign fine-print contracts consent to all reasonable terms contained in the fine print, but not to any unreasonable ones. 5 Ing' Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 Yale L J 271, 298-306 (1944). For a more recent and somewhat less skeptical review
of the competency cases, see Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 Case W Res L Rev 307, 352-56 (1988-89).
4 For a similar observation with respect to incompetency cases, see Alan Schwartz, A
Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability,63 Va L Rev 1053, 1077-78 (1977).
85See, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:Deciding Appeals
370 (Little, Brown, 1960) (emphasis added):
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deed, this is a perfectly plausible interpretation of the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine discussed earlier.88 The earlier interpretation of the doctrine was that buyers do not properly consent to any
clauses hidden in fine print, but that reasonable fine-print clauses
could still be enforced, because buyers are only protected by a liability rule. An equivalent way to characterize this result is to say
that a property rule will be used to protect buyers against all
terms they have not consented to, but buyers are deemed to have
consented to any reasonable terms contained in the fine print.
Under either characterization, all of the reasonable terms
will be
87
enforceable, and all of the unreasonable ones will not.

This technique of building substantive evaluations into the
definition of the entitlement to be protected has analogs in property and tort law. For example, nuisances are sometimes defined as
an "unreasonable" interference with another's property, with the
reasonableness of the interference to be determined by some form
of cost-benefit analysis which balances X's gains from the interference against Y's losses.88 Under this definition, Y can be protected
by a property rule rather than a liability rule, in the sense that any
unreasonable taking by X can be strictly enjoined or penalized
with severe sanctions. Obviously, though, courts implementing this
property rule have to make many of the same determinations they
would have to make if Y was given a broader entitlement against
all interference, but was protected only by a liability rule. Under
such a liability rule, courts have to measure Y's losses from every
interference, in order to calculate Y's damage award. Under a
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far
as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to,
specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but
one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any
not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form ....
" See text accompanying notes 54-59.
17 This equivalence is depicted in the decision tree in Figure 1, where there are two
different paths leading to the "enforce as written" result. As long as the upper path (in
which Y is deemed to have properly consented) is chosen only when X's terms are substantively reasonable, the two paths are practically identical. To be sure, some authors distinguish between the symbolic import of (a) enforcing those terms of X's contract whose substance is deemed reasonable, and (b) refusing to enforce those terms, but enforcing identical
obligations as part of the judge-made law to be applied after X's contract terms are ruled
unenforceable. See, for example, Rakoff, 96 Harv L Rev at 1260 (cited in note 62). As my
concern is entirely with the question of what obligations X may enforce against Y, I will not
distinguish between these two characterizations of the same outcome.
88 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 822, 826-828 (ALI, 1979). For a discussion, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining PropertyRights, 14
J Legal Stud 13 (1985).
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property rule protecting against unreasonable interference, courts
would normally have to measure both Y's losses and X's gains
from each interference, in order to determine whether Y's entitlement had been infringed.8 9
Thus, whenever the courts employ a property rule to protect
an entitlement which is itself defined by a "reasonableness" test,
the informational demands are very similar to those associated
with a liability rule. Moreover, the effect of such a rule will be the
same as that of a liability rule: terms deemed reasonable by the
courts will be enforceable, while terms deemed unreasonable will
not be. It follows that proper consent should not be defined in this
way unless we have some confidence in the ability of courts (or
some other agency) to conduct such an evaluation: institutional
competence should be dispositive in these cases as well. For the
remainder of this Article, I will treat these definitions of consent as
variations on a liability rule, regardless of how they are described.
II.

APPLICATIONS

Part I of this Article demonstrated that where the validity of
Y's consent is questioned, the choice facing courts is not merely
between enforcing and not enforcing the resulting contract. Instead, the law has three alternatives. The law can (a) declare Y's
consent to be valid and enforce the contract without any judicial
scrutiny of its substance, thus allowing the parties to create enforceable obligations without any change in their negotiating practices; (b) declare Y's consent invalid and protect Y with a property
rule, thus forcing the parties to change their negotiating practices
if they wish to create enforceable obligations; or (c) declare Y's
consent invalid and protect Y with a liability rule. The third option abandons any reliance on the parties' own negotiating practices, and turns the selection of enforceable obligations over to the
courts. Thus, Part I also argued that the definition of proper consent should be based entirely on pragmatic considerations whenever a liability rule is superior to a property rule. In other words,
whenever option (c) dominates option (b), the choice between the
two remaining options, (c) and (a), should be made by comparing
the court's ability to select reasonable obligations with the incentives facing the party who drafted the contract.

89 In certain cases, there may be proxies that would enable a court to evaluate the reasonableness of the interference without separately measuring Y's losses and X's gains. See
Cooter, 84 Colum L Rev at 1533-36 (cited in note 3).
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In this portion of the Article, I survey the problems or conditions most often advanced as invalidating consent, discussing
which of the three responses is most appropriate in each case. Of
course, any number of factors might arguably invalidate a party's
consent, and the discussion below does not pretend to be exhaustive. For convenience-although nothing of substance turns on
this-I divide the possible problems into three categories: those involving inadequate alternatives to the offered terms; those involving inadequate information about the offered terms or the available alternatives; and those involving inadequate competence to
process the information and decide between the offered terms and
their alternatives.
A. Inadequate Alternatives
I refer to "inadequate alternatives," rather than "lack of
choice," because cases involving a true lack of choice are exceedingly rare. Even a classic instance of duress at gunpoint leaves the
victim a choice of sorts: sign the contract, or be shot. At the other
extreme, even the mildest and most reasonable of offers could be
said to involve a kind of a threat--"If you do not accept my offer,
you'll be forced to fall back on whatever your next-best alternative
is"-even though the next-best alternative might be no worse than
buying a similar product at the same price from a seller one block
away. Most philosophical definitions of consent thus require some
way of deciding which alternatives are so unattractive, or so serious
a violation of the buyer's rights, or so illegitimate according to
some other criterion of legitimacy, as to justify the conclusion that
a buyer who chooses to sign the contract rather than accept the
alternative has not truly consented.9 0
1. Duress and necessity.
As noted earlier, duress at gunpoint is appropriately governed
by a property rule rather than a liability rule. Courts can therefore
enforce a rule against duress without having to evaluate the substance of the obligation X is attempting to enforce. As a consequence, questions about the ability of courts to conduct such evaluations are of little relevance in deciding whether duress should
count as invalidating Y's consent.
Cases of physical or economic necessity without duress-cases
in which X was not responsible for Y's necessity-present a harder
11

See text accompanying notes 68-72.
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problem for most philosophical theories of consent. If Y will drown
if he refuses to agree to X's contract, the unattractiveness of this
alternative is every bit as great as in the gunpoint case. If X has no
legal or moral duty to rescue Y from drowning, however, it is no
longer true that the only alternative to X's contract also violates
Y's legal or moral rights. Thus, to assess the validity of Y's consent
in cases of economic or physical necessity, a philosophical theory of
consent must specify more precisely the kinds of alternatives required for a valid act of consent.
My claim is that even a more fully-specified philosophical theory of consent would not settle the question of whether Y ought to
be released from his contract in cases of economic or physical necessity. As noted earlier, if necessity is taken to invalidate Y's consent, Y needs the protection of a liability rule rather than a property rule, for there will usually be no way for X to cure Y's
necessity and obtain proper consent.9 1 This means that deciding
that Y ought to be "released" from his contract is really just deciding that X should be entitled to a price set by the court, rather
than her own price. To be sure, if X is the only person in a position
to rescue Y, her price will not be constrained by competition, and
there may well be reason to prefer the court's price to X's. But if
we believe that a court would for some reason set too low a price,
thereby discouraging efficient rescues, 92 this argument for preferring the court's price disappears.
2.

Monopoly.

If X has a monopoly over some good or service that is not essential to Y-say, a monopoly over electric toasters-the case no
longer qualifies as one of economic or physical necessity. Y's alternatives will still be limited to accepting X's terms or doing without
her product, but now the alternative of doing without X's product
is a much less onerous option, which neither violates Y's legal
rights nor exposes him to tragic consequences. Accordingly, most
1 See text accompanying notes 6-7. The situation is different if X unjustifiably caused
Y's necessity by sabotaging his ship's rudder. In these cases, Y could well be protected by a
property rule, to deter X from creating the situation in which Y's proper consent can no
longer be obtained.
" For analyses of the optimal compensation for rescue services, see Buckley, 19 Hofstra
L Rev at 40-48 (cited in note 53); Eisenberg, 95 Harv L Rev at 754-63 (cited in note 34);
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J Legal Stud 83 (1978). Possible
reasons for being skeptical about the ability of courts (or of specialized regulatory commissions) to set an appropriate price are suggested in note 36.
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philosophical theories of consent would not treat Y's consent as
invalid if the monopolized product is not a necessity.
Notice, though, that if there are institutional competence arguments for preferring the court's pricing of necessities; those arguments are likely to be as strong when X's product is not a necessity. In either case, X's monopoly position gives us reason to think
the price set by X is not ideal. On the other hand, it should not be
any harder for the court to set a reasonable price for electric toasters than it would be to set a reasonable price for food or rescue
services. If anything, the case for judicial price-setting might actually be stronger in the case of non-necessities, for the consequence
of an erroneous price is less severe (too few toasters, as opposed to
too few rescue services). As far as considerations of institutional
competence are Concerned, therefore, the distinction between necessities and non-necessities is largely irrelevant.
Recall, too, that when Y challenges a non-price term, the institutional competence arguments for overriding X's contract are
weaker. As noted in Part 1,9 3 monopolists often have no incentive
to use inefficient non-price terms. Even when they do have such an
incentive-or when the reasonableness of the monopolist's terms is
judged by some criterion other than economic efficiency-requiring
the monopolist to adopt more reasonable terms without taking
away her ability to charge a monopoly price will not necessarily
leave customers better off.94 Thus, while most philosophical theories of consent do not differentiate between consenting to a monopolist's price and consenting to non-price terms, this distinction
could properly be part of a legal definition of proper consent. For
non-price terms, as for price, the key distinctions are those that go
to relative institutional competence, not those that rest on philosophical theories about the voluntariness of an agent's consent.
3.

Inability to obtain better terms.

In many cases, Y may have had the option of turning to several sellers other than X, but none will have offered terms better
than X's. A buyer in this situation faces a choice formally identical
to the one analyzed in the preceding subsections: accept the offered terms, or do without the product in question. From the
standpoint of most philosophical theories of consent, the validity
of Y's consent in this case might once again depend on whether the

See text accompanying notes 75-77.
See text accompanying notes 74-76.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:1

product in question is a necessity. When viewed from the standpoint of institutional competence, however, this case may present
either a stronger or a weaker argument for intervention than cases
in which X has a monopoly-depending on exactly why no seller is
offering better terms.
a) Perfectly competitive markets. If buyers are perfectly
informed and the market is perfectly competitive, the absence of
better terms suggests that no buyer is willing to pay enough to
make it profitable for sellers to offer the better term. If so, there is
no justification for requiring sellers to offer better terms, and
therefore no justification for treating Y's consent as invalid. Moreover, this conclusion holds whether or not the product in question
is a necessity.
b) Collusion. If the absence of better terms results not
from perfect competition, but from an agreement among sellers to
all offer the same terms,9 5 the question is more difficult. Cases of
collusion could be governed by a property rule in order to discourage inter-firm collusion. Refusing to enforce any collusively agreedupon obligations, even obligations that might benefit customers by
reducing the price of the product, does not ultimately prevent consumers from benefitting from reasonable terms. It merely requires
sellers who want to offer such terms to offer them unilaterally.
The drawback of this approach, however, is that it may not
always be desirable to stop sellers from agreeing on the terms they
offer. Even the antitrust laws do not always condemn such agreements as illegal per se, although the law on this point is somewhat
murky." If courts deciding antitrust cases cannot condemn such
agreements without at least some evaluation of the merits of the
agreed-upon terms, it might be unwise for courts deciding contract
cases to do so. If courts must evaluate the merits of the agreedupon terms in order to decide whether to enforce them, questions
about the court's competence at evaluating those terms would once
again be dispositive.

95 See, for example, Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ 358, 161 A2d 69, 87
(1960).
" Compare National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679
(1978) (condemning an agreement by engineering firms not to bid on a job while any other
firm was being considered for the same job), with Vogel v American Soc'y of Appraisers,
744 F2d 598 (7th Cir 1984) (refusing to condemn an agreement by gem appraisers not to
charge fees calculated as a percentage of the value they assign to the gem as a result of their
appraisal).
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c) Lemons equilibria. Finally, if sellers are competing
with each other but buyers are not well-informed, the absence of
better terms can result from a "lemons" equilibrium. Because
terms that are good for buyers are generally more expensive for
sellers, any seller that offers better terms will charge a higher price
to make the same level of profits she could make by offering less
favorable terms at a lower price. However, if most buyers have
good information about prices but only poor information about
non-price terms, they may not notice an improvement in non-price
terms, while they will definitely notice the higher price. As a result,
many buyers may stop purchasing from this seller. If the number
of buyers who stop purchasing is sufficiently large, the seller will
end up losing money as a result of her decision to offer the more
favorable terms at a higher price. In that case, no seller has an
incentive to offer the more favorable terms, and the result is an
equilibrium in which only bad contract terms (or "lemons") can be
97
obtained.
In markets with this problem, there may well be reasons for
doubting the efficiency of the terms selected by sellers. However,
courts (or other agencies) might not be any better at selecting efficient terms, or terms that are more desirable according to another
appropriate criterion. Thus, in deciding whether this problem
should be treated as invalidating Y's consent, the choice should
rest entirely on considerations of relative institutional competence.
If courts are likely to do worse than the admittedly imperfect market, Y's consent in these cases should still be treated as valid, in
'7 For formal economic models of this equilibrium, see George A. Akerlof, The Market
for "Lemons": Quality Uncertaintyand the Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488 (1970);
Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44
Rev Econ Stud 561 (1977). Akerlof and Spence modeled markets in which consumers had
good information about price and bad information about the product's physical characteristics, leading to an equilibrium in which only products with sub-optimal physical characteristics were produced or marketed. However, the analysis can easily be extended to imperfect
information about contract terms, by substituting the "quality" of the seller's contract for
the physical quality of the seller's product. See, for example, Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-InvisibleHand, 17 J L & Econ 461 (1974); Kennedy, 41 Md L
Rev at 597-603 (cited in note 42); Comment, Unconscionabilityin Standard Forms, 64 Cal
L Rev 1151, 1177-79 (1976).
Interestingly, if buyers' information could be made even worse, so that every buyer who
is poorly informed about a seller's non-price terms is also poorly informed about that seller's
price, sellers' incentives respecting non-price terms would then be less seriously distorted. In
many cases, the incentive to distort non-price terms might be eliminated entirely (although
it might be replaced by an incentive to charge supra-competitive prices). For an analysis of
equilibria in which buyers are equally ill-informed about both price and non-price terms, see
Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va L Rev 1387 (1983).
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spite of his inability to obtain better terms from another seller. If
courts are likely to do a better job than the market, Y's consent
should not be treated as valid-although Y's consent might still be
treated as valid in other markets where no better terms can be obtained, such as markets that are perfectly competitive. In short,
the choice should rest entirely on the reasons for the market's performance and the prospect of better performance from the courts.
4.

Take-it-or-leave-it negotiating postures.

Finally, courts and commentators sometimes object to a
seller's refusal to negotiate over contract terms in a "take-it-orleave-it" negotiating posture.9 8 Such a posture limits Y's alternatives by forcing him to choose between (a) accepting that seller's
terms, or (b) not doing business with that seller. This limitation
may not be severe, for nothing in this description precludes there
being equally good terms available from some other seller up the
street. Thus, most objections to a seller's take-it-or-leave-it posture
are probably objections to the adoption of such a posture when no
better terms are available, or when one of the other problems discussed in this section is present. 9 Absent one of these other factors, it is difficult to regard a take-it-or-leave-it posture as sufficient to invalidate Y's consent under any philosophical theory of
consent.
The analysis is equally easy under the pragmatic approach advocated here, if we assume that a seller's take-it-or-leave-it posture
should (at most) trigger a liability rule. If we wanted to encourage

98 See, for example, Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About

Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum L Rev 629, 632 (1943) ("[s]tandardized contracts are frequently contracts of adhesion; they are &prendre ou a laisser").
9' Thus, the term "contract of adhesion" is sometimes used to refer to any contract
whose drafter adopts a take-it-or-leave-it posture, but is sometimes limited to contracts
where the drafter adopts a take-it-or-leave-it posture and the drafter has a monopoly, or
where there are no better terms available from other sellers; or to contracts where the
drafter adopts a take-it-or-leave-it posture and the contract is a long one full of fine print
that many buyers would be unlikely to understand. For a discussion of these and other
defining factors, see Rakoff, 96 Harv L Rev at 1176-80 (cited in note 62).
Because of these ambiguities surrounding the term "contract of adhesion," I do not use
it here. For similar reasons, I also make no use of the umbrella concept.of "unequal bargaining power." While that phrase has never been successfully defined, it does not appear to
mean anything other than some combination of the factors already identified and discussed-economic necessity, an inability to obtain better terms elsewhere in the market, or
perhaps monopoly or collusion on the part of sellers. For a further discussion of the concept
of unequal bargaining power, see Kennedy, 41 Md L Rev at 614-24 (cited in note 42); Alan
Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49 Ind L J 367
(1974); Trebilcock, 26 U Toronto L J at 363-66 (cited in note 60).
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sellers to haggle over every contract term, a take-it-or-leave-it posture could be met with a property rule, barring any seller who
adopts such a posture from enforcing any obligations whatsoever.
There is no reason, though, to encourage sellers to haggle over each
term-and several reasons not to require such a practice, as every
writer to address the question has recognized. 10 0 Especially in
large-scale enterprises, where the person dealing with customers is
an untrained sales clerk, there are obvious drawbacks to authorizing the clerk to redraft the standard contract on the spot. Thus, if
X's take-it-or-leave-it posture is deemed to invalidate Y's consent
at all, the most appropriate response is surely a liability rule.
Under the approach urged here, if invalidating Y's consent
triggers a liability rule then Y's consent should be invalidated only
if there is some reason to think courts can do better than X in
selecting reasonable terms. There is no reason, however, to think
that a take-it-or-leave-it posture should distort a seller's incentives
respecting the terms she offers, as long as none of the other
problems discussed in this section are present. Moreover, none of
the problems discussed in this section is in any way aggravated by
a seller's adoption of a take-it-or-leave-it posture. Accordingly, the
presence of a take-it-or-leave-it posture should be dismissed as irrelevant to the enforceability of X's contract.
B.

Inadequate Information

Even if a buyer has acceptable alternatives to the seller's
terms, another class of potential problems may arise if the buyer
lacks the information needed to properly evaluate the seller's
terms or the available alternatives. One instance of inadequate information-the "lemons" equilibrium, in which the buyer's inability to compare seller's terms reduces the seller's incentive to compete by offering better terms-has already been discussed. In that
equilibrium, though, even a buyer who was fully aware of every
seller's terms could not find a better term anywhere else on the
market. By contrast, the problems discussed in this section arise
even if better terms are available from other sellers elsewhere in
the market, or even if the alternative of refusing to sign the contract is perfectly acceptable. In other words, the information
problems discussed in this subsection (and the psychological

100

Kessler, 43 Colum L Rev at 631-32 (cited in note 98); Karl L. Llewellyn, What Price

Contract-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L J 704, 731-34 (1931); Rakoff, 96 Harv L Rev
at 1220-25 (cited in note 62).
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problems discussed in the following subsection) apply to cases
where Y would be better off choosing his next-best alternative
rather than signing X's contract. The problems discussed in the
preceding subsection arose when Y was indeed better off signing
X's contract rather than accepting his next-best alternative, but
his next-best alternative was for some reason deemed inadequate
to make his choice truly voluntary.
1.

Fraud.

The easiest cases to analyze are those involving outright fraud,
where X knowingly misrepresents the object sold, the terms of the
contract, or any other fact relevant to Y's decision. The elimination of fraud, like the elimination of gun-to-the-head duress, is easily within X's power. As a consequence, in any case where Y's consent is deemed invalid because of fraud, the courts can protect Y
with a property rule.
In some cases, it might be argued that the law should permit
fraud in order to protect sellers' incentives to gather and disseminate valuable information. That is, if sellers are not allowed to lie
in response to direct questions from buyers, they might not be able
to keep their valuable information concealed, which might reduce
their incentive to gather that information in the first place. 10 1 If
this argument is accepted, there is no reason to treat such fraud as
invalidating Y's consent in a way that triggers a property rule. The
only purpose of a property rule is to discourage the behavior that
triggers its application, and if the "justifiable fraud" argument is
accepted then this sort of fraud should not be discouraged.
Even if the justifiable fraud argument is accepted, however, it
does not necessarily argue against allowing justifiable fraud to trigger a liability rule. That is, even justifiable fraud can invalidate Y's
consent, as long as Y is protected by a liability rule. Certainly,
courts applying a liability rule would have to be careful to avoid
restricting too severely the obligations that X is allowed to enforce,
"I1See

Barnett, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 794-801 (cited in note 11); compare

Kronman, 89 Yale L J at 489-91 (cited in note 74). This argument has been discussed most
extensively in connection with the laws governing securities fraud. See Jonathan R. Macey
and Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan L Rev 1059 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited, 77 Va L Rev 1001 (1991); Ian Ayres, Back to
Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 Va L Rev 945 (1991); Paul
G. Mahoney, PrecautionCosts and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 Va L Rev
623 (1992); Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud,67 NYU L Rev (forthcoming
1993).
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to avoid penalizing X to the point where she is deterred from gathering the information in the first place. In other words, the substantive criteria by which courts evaluate the reasonableness of X's
obligation would have to be constrained by the policy of not unduly discouraging the acquisition of valuable information. However, there is no reason why courts could not allow X to enforce
sufficiently favorable obligations to allow her a reasonable return
on her information-gathering efforts, while preventing her from
overreaching and obtaining an unnecessarily large return. 102 The
only argument against this form of judicial regulation is a fear that
courts would not be very good at determining a reasonable rate of
return, and might therefore unduly discourage (or unduly encourage) the acquisition of information. In short, once a liability
rule is accepted as the best alternative to automatic enforcement of
X's contract, questions of institutional competence once again become decisive.
2.

Misleading acts or omissions.

A more plausible argument for not discouraging certain kinds
of deception applies to statements which, though misleading in
some respects, may also communicate truthful and useful information. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s American advertising law made it difficult, and at times impossible, for any cigarette
company to advertise a low level of tar or nicotine. The theory behind the restriction was that consumers might form an exaggerated
opinion about the relative safety of brands that made prominent
claims about low tar and nicotine levels. The effect, however, was
to halt what had been a steady trend toward lower tar and nicotine
levels in cigarettes-a trend that did not resume until years later,
when the law was changed to allow cigarette companies to advertise improved tar and nicotine levels more freely. In other words,
the law's attempt to discourage sellers from making statements
that may have misled some buyers made it harder for all buyers to
find out about improvements in product safety.10 3
101For analyses of the effect of X's returns on her incentives to gather information-including the possibility that too large a return might induce excessive informationgathering activities-see Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics at 258-61 (cited in note 39);
Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Economic Exchange,
Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 91 (April 1991).
103 For more detailed discussions of this history-including evidence that the larger cigarette companies supported the legal ban, to insulate them from the competition of smaller
companies who first produced many of the low-tar cigarettes-see John E. Calfee, Cigarette
Advertising, Health Informationand Regulation Before 1970, U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
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Whenever the misleading effects of statements cannot be eliminated costlessly, a trade-off is required to determine what precautions sellers ought to take, and at what cost to other consumers, in
order to reduce the risk of misleading*some buyers. I have argued
elsewhere that this trade-off is similar to one often faced in products liability law, where the issue is whether some product design
change by a seller would have reduced the risk of physical injury
without unduly detracting from the product's utility.10 4 A similar

cost-benefit analysis can be applied to misleading advertising:
Would any change in the wording of the advertisement produce
benefits (by reducing the likelihood that consumers would be misled) in excess of any costs the change would produce (by misleading consumers in other respects, or by reducing the amount of
truthful information available to them). Most cases of outright
fraud present an easy case under this standard, as their elimination would reduce the risk of misleading consumers without
causing consumers to lose any truthful or useful information. In
other cases, however-perhaps including the low-tar cigarette
claims-the balance would tip in favor of not requiring sellers to
modify or eliminate their claims.
The direction in which this balance tips is crucial to the analysis of misleading statements in contract cases. If the court determines that the misleading statements should have been changed,
such statements can trigger a property rule to encourage X (and
others like her) not to make such statements in the future. On the
other hand, if the court is unwilling to decide whether the statements should have been changed, the statements should be treated
as (at most) triggering a liability rule. Moreover, the choice between this second option and the third alternative-treating such
statements as irrelevant to the enforceability of X's contract-should depend on considerations of institutional
competence.

sion Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 134, (1985); Robert McAuliffe, The FTC and
the Effectiveness of CigaretteAdvertising Regulations, 7 J Pub Pol & Marketing 49 (1988).
A. somewhat similar effect was recently observed following the lifting of a legal ban on the
use of health information to promote breakfast cereals. Pauline M. Ippolito and Alan D.
Mathios, Information, Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21
RAND J Econ 459 (1990).
104 Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 BU L Rev 657 (1985);
Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64
S Cal L Rev 549 (1991).
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These three alternatives can be illustrated by considering the
advertising involved in Collins v Uniroyal, Inc.10 5 One of Uniroyal's customers was killed when his tire blew out, and his estate
sued for breach of warranty. However, Uniroyal's sales contract
had disclaimed any liability for consequential damages during the
warranty period. The court refused to enforce this limitation, relying in part on Uniroyal's advertising claims concerning the safety
of its tires. Uniroyal's ads had claimed: "If it only saves your life
once, it's a bargain.... You're getting a brute of a carcass that's so
strong, you can practically forget about blowouts."10 6 This language could have misled some consumers by causing them to form
an exaggerated opinion of the extent of Uniroyal's safety
advantage.
Interestingly, nothing in the court's opinion rules out the possibility that Uniroyal's tires may have had a significant safety advantage over most other brands. If Uniroyal's tires were in fact
safer than most other brands, it is hardly obvious that we want to
discourage Uniroyal from calling that fact to consumers' attention.
Perhaps Uniroyal could have accurately described its safety advantage without misleading as many consumers, by adding some qualifying language to its ads ("If it only saves your life once, it's a
bargain-but you should realize that even Uniroyal tires blow out
occasionally, and if the tire does blow out you shouldn't expect
Uniroyal to pay for any consequential damages you may suffer.")
However, such a disclaimer might not have prevented very many
consumers from being misled, especially if many wouldn't have understood the legal significance of the term "consequential damages." Moreover, inserting such a disclaimer in a thirty-second television spot might also distract consumers from the (by
assumption) truthful safety claims being made by Uniroyal, thus
reducing the effective communication of truthful material.
If the court had decided that Uniroyal should have advertised
differently-either by withdrawing the claim entirely, or by adding
more qualifying language-the court could then have treated Uniroyal's advertising as sufficient to trigger a property rule. That is,
the court could have refused to allow Uniroyal to enforce its limit
on consequential damages even if a limit on consequential damages
would otherwise be reasonable: even if full liability for consequen105126 NJ Super 401, 315 A2d 30, aff'd, 64 NJ 260, 315 A2d 16 (1974). This case also
involved a contract that was written in a potentially confusing manner; that aspect of the
case will be discussed in the following subsection.
.. Collins, 315 A2d at 34-35.
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tial damages would raise the price of tires by more than consumers
were willing to pay. Such a holding would not prevent Uniroyal
from enforcing a limit on consequential damages; it would simply
prevent Uniroyal from enforcing such a limit without changing its
advertising. Thus, this holding also would not call into question
the court's ability to evaluate the substantive merits of limits on
consequential damages.
To be sure, a decision enforcing a property rule would in this
case implicate a different sort of institutional competence. Such a
decision would require the court to weigh the informational costs
and benefits of certain advertisements, in order to make sure that
a property rule is triggered only when the seller should in fact have
changed the advertising in question. As the informational costs
and benefits of advertising are often difficult to measure, 10 7 a high
degree of competence may be required to make that determination.
Notice, though, that the competence called for here is competence
in designing an ideal agreement process, not competence in evaluating the. substance of the resulting obligations. Thus, a court
should enforce a property rule if it is more confident in its ability
to decide when the seller's advertising should have been changed
than in its ability to evaluate the substance of the seller's contract
terms.
If the court is not willing to decide that Uniroyal's advertising
should have been changed, protecting the buyer with a property
rule can no longer be justified. In that event, the court must choose
between treating Uniroyal's advertising as (a) triggering a liability
rule, or (b) not invalidating the buyer's consent at all. If the court
treats Uniroyal's advertising as triggering a liability rule, the court
will then have to decide whether Uniroyal's exclusion of consequential damages was reasonable, or whether some court-determined measure of damages should be enforced instead. Obviously,
this decision would require consideration of the effect of full liability on the price of tires, as well as a selection of substantive criteria
by which that effect could be evaluated. Thus, if the court does not
believe that Uniroyal's advertising should have been changed, the
choice between applying a liability rule or enforcing Uniroyal's
limit automatically should turn on whether we think damage measures selected by the courts are likely to be better than the ones
selected by Uniroyal. In other words, the decision should turn on
the adequacy of the market incentives facing Uniroyal, and on the
107

See Craswell, 65 BU L Rev 657 (cited in note 104); CrasweU, 64 S Cal L Rev 549

(cited in note 104).
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court's likely competence in evaluating the substance of the seller's
terms.
Of course, many arguments can be made on both sides of this
institutional competence issue. On one hand, the fact that the
court's opinion never even discussed the possible benefits of higher
or lower damage measures might make us less than confident
about any damage measure selected by the court. On the other
hand, if buyers pay little attention to warranties and a good deal of
attention to prices, a "market for lemons" might develop that
should make us less than confident about the damage measure selected by Uniroyal. 08 This reason for questioning the warranty selected by Uniroyal has little to do with the language of its advertisement, however, and more to do with the factors affecting the
performance of the market in general. In short, if we are unwilling
to decide that Uniroyal's advertising should have been changed,
the enforceability of its contract should depend primarily on an
analysis of market incentives and judicial or administrative expertise, and hardly at all on whether the particular buyer before the
court was or was not deceived.
3.

Confusing or unreadable contracts.

A similar analysis applies if X's contract is written in a way
that misleads Y into thinking the terms are more generous than
they really are. This is the familiar example of a contract that
promises a full warranty on its first page or in large print, while
taking back most of the warranty in fine-print provisions elsewhere
in the contract. 0 9 Such a practice has often been analogized to
fraud, even by writers who take an economic approach to unconscionability. "1 0 However, the proper handling of this problem-like
that of misleading advertising, or even some instances of outright
fraud-depends on whether the misleading impression is one that
we think the seller ought to have prevented.
In some cases, it may be desirable for X to rewrite her contract to make it less misleading. In these cases, the court should
adopt a property rule and prevent X from enforcing any clauses
"I See text accompanying note 97.
1o This criticism was raised against the contracts involved in Gerhardt v Continental
Insurance Companies, 48 NJ 291, 225 A2d 328 (1966) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 16-19); Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ 358, 161 A2d 69 (1960); and
Collins v Uniroyal, Inc., 64 NJ 260, 315 A2d 16 (1974).
110 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 113-14 (cited in note 27);
Epstein, 18 J L & Econ at 302 n 28 (cited in note 6); Trebilcock, 26 U Toronto L J at 370-71

(cited in note 60).
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written in an unreasonably confusing manner, without regard to
the clauses' substantive reasonableness. Adopting a property rule
does not permanently bar X from enforcing reasonable contract
terms; it simply prevents her from doing so in a contract that is
unnecessarily confusing or misleading. The purpose of such a rule,
of course, is to encourage X not to use such misleading contracts in
the future.
In many cases, though, there is little to be gained from making
contracts less confusing or more easily readable. If buyers do not
read contracts anyway, reducing the contract's length or improving
its clarity will not have any effect.11 ' If so, this does not mean that
Y must be treated as having consented to every term in the contract-but it does mean that X's failure to use a simpler contract
should no longer trigger a property rule. Instead, either Y should
be treated as having fully consented to every term in the contract,
or Y should not be treated as having fully consented but the courts
should protect him with a liability rule. These options both abandon the effort to get X to use shorter or more readable contracts,
but the first option enforces any terms chosen by X while the second option enforces only those terms approved by the court. Accordingly, the choice between these two options should be based on
a comparison between X's market incentives and the court's institutional expertise-just as in any other context where a lack of
consent could only be protected by a liability rule.
Indeed, there is some evidence that courts may be drawing
roughly this distinction under the "reasonable expectations" doctrine. For example, Kenneth Abraham's survey of cases applying
the doctrine to insurance contracts distinguishes between those
cases where the insurance company in some way caused the insured to believe the policy to be more generous than it actually
was, and those in which the insurance company's conduct played
no such role."' Only in the latter set of cases does Abraham find
courts to be concerned with their own evaluation of the substance
of the challenged terms."' Thus, courts may in fact be applying a
property rule to cases where the insurance company should have
altered its conduct to avoid misleading its customers, and a liabil1

Slawson, 48 S Cal L Rev at 16-18 (cited in note 64).

112 Abraham, 67 Va L Rev at 1154 (cited in note 54).

.. Id at 1166. Notice, though, that identifying the insurance company as having
"caused" the insured's exaggerated expectation does not always imply that the insurance
company should have done something differently. See id at 1173-74 (recognizing that altering the potentially misleading aspect of the policy or the company's behavior may involve
costs that exceed any benefit likely to be realized from the alteration).
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ity rule to those cases where the company should not have altered
its conduct.
Finally, a similar analysis applies if we consider the possibility
that X, rather than making her contract shorter or easier to read,
could have pointed out the clauses to Y and explained them orally.
If it is feasible for X to point out all such clauses, her failure to do
so should trigger a property rule, which would bar her from enforcing any clauses that were not so explained. As discussed in Part I,
however, many contracts contain so many clauses that they could
not all be pointed out orally prior to every sale. 114 In that case, a
court should at most treat X's failure to point out a clause as triggering a liability rule, which would prevent her from enforcing only
those obligations that were both not pointed out and deemed unreasonable by the court.
Admittedly, when the only impediment to proper consent is
X's failure to explain the terms of a fine-print contract, the court's
substantive evaluation does not have to be quite as fine-tuned as it
does when other impediments are present. In particular, an argument might be made for adopting a test for substantive reasonableness that is slightly overinclusive, even if this brands as "unreasonable" a small number of obligations that ought to be
enforceable. As long as the number of obligations singled out in
this way is not so large as to make it impracticable for sellers to
point them all out to buyers, the only consequence of this overinclusiveness is a slight increase in transaction costs as sellers are
forced to point out a relatively small number of terms prior to
every sale. In this respect, the impediment to proper consent
presented by a fine-print contract is somewhat different from the
impediment presented by the unconscious patient or the shipwrecked sailor, where there is no way to overcome the impediment
and secure the other party's consent with respect to even a single
term. The impediment represented by fine-print contracts can indeed be overcome by sellers, if they are only required to overcome
it with respect to a small number of terms.
However, even the possibility of being somewhat overinclusive
does not free courts from needing some criteria for evaluating the
substance of challenged obligations. If the courts paid no attention
at all to the substantive merit of the challenged obligations, the
outer limits of overinclusiveness could easily be exceeded, and the
number of obligations identified as unreasonable would then be-

114

See text accompanying notes 16-20.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:1

come too large to be practicably explained to every buyer. As with
any liability rule, a judicial evaluation of the merits of the proposed obligation is essential for the rule to have its desired effect.
Accordingly, the choice between treating a buyer as having fully
consented to the unexplained terms, or treating him as not having
fully consented and protecting him with a liability rule, should
once more depend on considerations of institutional competence.
C.

Inadequate Mental Competence

In some cases, even if a buyer has all the information needed
to choose between the seller's contract and the next best alternative, the buyer may be psychologically incompetent to make that
choice. Of course, defining "psychologically competent" is difficult
even as a matter of theory; identifying psychological competence in
practice is even harder. 11 5 Even in this difficult area, however,
there are benefits to distinguishing between property rules and liability rules.
1.

Undue influence.

In some cases the condition that reduces the buyer's competence is temporary, usually the result of some emotional shock.
These are the cases involving widows approached the day after
their husband's funeral and persuaded to deed away their interest
in their husband's estate, 116 or schoolteachers persuaded to resign
after going without sleep for forty hours following their arrest for
'
"homosexual activity. 1117
In these cases, if X had no particular need to close the deal at
that time, Y's diminished competence could easily have been corrected, simply by waiting until he had a chance to recover from his
emotional shock. Accordingly, if Y should be given any protection
at all in these cases, it should probably be the protection of a property rule rather than a liability rule. That is, if X unnecessarily
115 For a useful discussion of the standard tests for mental competence in contract law,

see Meiklejohn, 39 Case W Res L Rev 307 (cited in note 83). More skeptical views can be
found in Green, 53 Yale L J 271 (cited in note 83); Kennedy, 41 Md L Rev at 631-49 (cited
in note 42); George J. Alexander and Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., From Contract to Status via
Psychiatry, 13 Santa Clara Law 537 (1973). There is, of course, a much larger literature
describing and criticizing the tests used to judge mental competence in other legal contexts.
See, for example, Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S Cal L Rev 527 (1978); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse
Treatment, 69 NC L Rev 945 (1991).
"I Moore v Moore, 81 Cal 195, 22 P 589 (1889).
117 Odorizzi v Bloomfield School District, 246 Cal App 2d 123, 54 Cal Rptr 533 (1966).
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refuses to wait until Y's competence has returned to normal, X
should be barred from enforcing any obligations against Y, even
those whose substance seems perfectly reasonable. The purpose of
such a rule would be to encourage X and Y to decide for themselves which obligations are reasonable once Y's competence has
returned to normal, rather than allowing X to shift that decision to
a reviewing court.
Interestingly, some courts have made X's ability to wait out
Y's temporary incompetence part of the defining elements of undue influence. Traditional definitions of undue influence-for example, persuasion "which overcomes the will without convincing
the judgment""s-are notoriously difficult to apply, especially in a
way that distinguishes truly objectionable cases from ordinary
sales techniques. Thus, one leading opinion suggests that a finding
of undue influence should turn on some combination of the following factors:
(1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2) consummation of the transaction in an unusual
place, (3) insistent demand that the business be finished at
once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward consequences of delay .... 19
This definition focuses on precisely those aspects of X's conduct
that can be and should have been avoided. In other words, these
are precisely the aspects of X's conduct that justify applying a
property rule rather than a liability rule.
2.

Incapacity.

If the buyer's diminished competence is not merely temporary,
the choice between a property rule or a liability rule is more complex. If Y is permanently insane, it is hardly practicable to tell any
X who has a substantively reasonable proposal that she should
wait until Y's competence returns, when his proper consent can be
obtained. The same is true when Y's incapacity stems from his status as a minor. As X cannot practicably correct either of these
sources of diminished competence, it can be argued that Y should
be protected at most with a liability rule. Courts often do enforce
reasonable obligations against persons who might otherwise be
deemed permanently incompetent-either by striking down the
,

Id at 130.

n Id at 133 (emphasis added). The other factors listed by the Odorizzi court are discussed in note 121.
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contract but allowing X to sue for the reasonable value of her services in restitution, or by ruling that Y was in fact competent when
120
X's proposal seems substantively reasonable.
Even when Y's incompetence is relatively permanent, however,
it may still be appropriate to protect Y with a property rule if X
could have avoided the problem by dealing with Y's guardian. For
example, if Y is judged legally insane and has a guardian appointed, any X who believes her proposed contract to be reasonable should be required to approach Y's guardian and obtain his or
her agreement to the contract, rather than inducing an incompetent Y to sign the contract and then asking the court to perform
the guardian's function. After all, one rationale for appointing
guardians (rather than having the court itself serve as the guardian) is to spare courts the need to make such day-to-day decisions
for incompetent parties, by entrusting those decisions to someone
who will have a closer knowledge of Y's affairs and a closer sympathy with Y's interests. A similar analysis could apply to buyers who
are underage, but who have a parent or other legal guardian that
the seller could have contacted.
If Y does not have an official guardian, the problem is more
difficult. Even in these cases, though, it may be preferable to solve
the problem by having Y consult some competent adviser (a friend,
clergyman, or lawyer) who could advise him about X's offer, rather
than having the court fulfill that role. In other words, X's failure to
encourage or allow an incompetent Y to seek independent advice
might itself be grounds for protecting Y with a property rule rather
than a liability rule, if we believe that the use of such third-party
advisors ought to be encouraged. 121 In this situation, therefore, a
decision about whether to treat X's failure to involve a third-party
advisor in the process requires yet another institutional competence assessment-in this case, an assessment of the relative competence of the third-party advisor as compared to the court. The
better the quality of the advisors available to Y (including a courtappointed legal guardian), the stronger the case for treating X's
failure to involve those advisers as triggering a property rule.

120
121

See text accompanying note 83.
The other factors cited by the Odorizzi court as possible determinants of undue

influence were:
(5) the use of multiple persuaders by the dominant side against a single servient party,
(6) absence of third-party advisers to the servient party, (7) statements that there is
no time to consult financial advisers or attorneys.
246 Cal App 2d at 133 (emphasis added).
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Finally, in cases where no acceptable guardian is available and
Y's incompetence is relatively permanent, protecting Y with a
property rule would obviously be undesirable. A property rule applied to such a case would prevent Y from entering into any enforceable contracts whatsoever, making it difficult for Y to obtain
goods or services. To avoid this result, courts must (and do) protect Y with something closer to a liability rule, under which obligations that seem reasonable to the court may be enforced. In these
cases, therefore, courts must address all the issues discussed earlier
in Section I.B, concerning the possible "reasonableness" criteria
that might be employed. In particular, the court must concern itself with the price that will be charged for any additional protection it might require from X, and with deciding which protections
would be worth that higher price. Only if we are confident that the
court will be able to make these judgments better than Y should
we treat Y's diminished competence as invalidating his apparent
consent.
CONCLUSION

As has often been noted, economists and non-economists tend
to approach unconscionability from very different perspectives.12 2
Standard economic theory holds that perfectly competitive markets will maximize consumer welfare, so most economists conclude
that contracts should be overridden only if there is some "market
failure" which prevents this outcome from being realized, and even
then only if the government can do a better job than the market.
Accordingly, most economists focus their inquiry on the performance of the market as a whole and on the competence of government agencies, rather than on the behavior of individual parties to
a single transaction. By contrast, non-economists tend to focus on
individual transactions, in order to ask whether the weaker party
knowingly and voluntarily consented to the obligation in question.
Moreover, most non-economists look to philosophical or legal theories of consent to define the conditions needed to make an individual transaction truly knowing or voluntary. They thus reject the
economists' conclusion that the enforceability of a contract should

122 For example, Comment, 64 Cal L Rev at 1153-57 (cited in note 97); Schwartz and
Wilde, 127 U Pa L Rev at 635-39 (cited in note 65); Katz, 21 RAND J Econ at 520-22 (cited
in note 29).
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depend not on philosophical theories of consent, but on whether
the market as a whole is working efficiently.12 3
Unfortunately, participants on both sides of this debate tend
to approach the problem as a simple question of "whether X's contract ought to be enforced," without paying much attention to the
legal consequences that might follow non-enforcement. In particular, little attention has been paid to the distinction between refusing to let X enforce any obligations whatsoever, as opposed to refusing to let her enforce any obligations except those the court
considers reasonable-thatis, to the distinction between property
rules and liability rules. As a consequence, it is not surprising that
there has been no discussion of which reasons for invalidating a
contract ought to trigger a property rule, and which ought to trigger a liability rule. Nor has much attention been paid to the criteria by which courts might evaluate the substantive reasonableness
of an obligation, in cases where a liability rule is appropriate.
In this Article, I have suggested tentative answers to all of
these questions. For example, the choice between property rules
and liability rules ought to depend on the cost of overcoming the
impediment to consent that provides the reason for invalidating
X's contract. If the impediment can easily be overcome, protecting
Y with a property rule will usually be appropriate, but if the impediment cannot be overcome, or can only be overcome at great
expense, then if Y is to be protected at all it will usually be better
to adopt a liability rule. Moreover, the choice between either of
these options and the third possible outcome-enforcing X's contract automatically, without any judicial scrutiny of its reasonableness-should turn on different considerations depending on
whether the best alternative to automatic enforcement is a liability
rule or a property rule. If the choice is between enforcing X's contract or applying a liability rule, Y will be bound either by terms
that X selected (if the contract is enforced) or by terms deemed
reasonable by the courts (if the contract is invalidated). A comparison of the terms likely to be selected by X and by the
courts-that is, an economic analysis of X's market incentives and
the competence of the legal institutions-is therefore crucial to
choosing the proper rule for these cases. Moreover, as neither of
these outcomes will make Y's consent any more informed or any
more voluntary, philosophical theories of autonomy and consent
123 For example, Slawson, 46 U Pitt L Rev at 42 (cited in note 54), criticizes recent
economic analysis for concluding "that courts ought to enforce whatever terms a seller
chooses to impose without regard to whether a buyer has agreed to them."
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are largely irrelevant to the choice of outcome. On the other hand,
when the choice is between enforcing a contract and applying a
property rule, the court will either enforce X's terms (if the contract is upheld) or seek to encourage a better negotiation process
(if not), and in neither case will the court have to decide for itself
which obligations are substantively reasonable. In this class of
cases, concerns about the relative performance of courts and markets are largely irrelevant to the proper outcome, while processbased theories (including most philosophical theories of consent)
may have more to contribute.
Others may, of course, disagree with the answers I have suggested. Even for those who agree, there is much work still to be
done in analyzing market failures and institutional competence for
those cases where a liability rule would be most appropriate, and
in developing criteria for evaluating the substantive reasonableness
of contested obligations. My main point, however, is that none of
these questions can even be framed until unconscionability is seen
as more than just a matter of whether Y consented to X's terms, or
even of whether X's contract ought to be enforced or not. Instead,
the phrase "enforced or not" must be unpacked into at least three
possibilities: automatic enforcement, protection of Y with a property rule, or protection of Y with a liability rule. Only then can the
key issues in unconscionability cases be addressed.

